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WHEN A STATUTE COMES WITH A USER MANUAL:
RECONCILING TEXTUALISM AND UNIFORM ACTS
Gregory A. Elinson*
Robert H. Sitkoff**
ABSTRACT
This Article develops an interpretive theory for statutes that originate as
Uniform Acts promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission. Although
overlooked in the literature on statutory interpretation, state-enacted Uniform
Acts are ubiquitous. They shape our life cycles—governing marriage,
parentage, divorce, and death—and structure trillions of dollars in daily
commercial transactions.
Largely focusing on textualism, today’s dominant form of statutory
interpretation, we analyze the interpretive consequences of two unusual features
of state-enacted Uniform Acts. First, the text of every Uniform Act directs courts
to interpret it to “promote uniformity.” Second, each provision is accompanied
by an official explanatory comment, analogous to a user manual for interpreters.
We argue that, in light of these features, foundational textualist principles
obligate courts to consider legislative intent as expressed in the official
comments—what textualists would otherwise dismiss as legislative history—
when they interpret a statute originating as a Uniform Act.
More specifically, this Article explores what we call the “directives” and
“signals” that state legislatures send when they enact a Uniform Act. As enacted
statutory text, the promote-uniformity clause directs courts to treat the official
comments as persuasive authority on the statute’s meaning. Moreover, even if a
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legislature enacts only a portion of a Uniform Act, the legislature signals that
courts should treat the comments as persuasive authority by virtue of the choice
to incorporate language from a Uniform Act rather than some alternative text.
Moving from theory to practice, we develop a canon of construction for
interpreting this significant but under-studied species of positive law. We also
present a series of puzzles and complications arising from “hybrid” enactments
of bespoke and Uniform statutory language. More generally, by colliding
textualist theory with the two-step political economy of state-enacted Uniform
Acts, the Article broadens our understanding of textualism and adapts it to this
critical but overlooked category of statute.
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INTRODUCTION
Every day, courts across the country interpret a distinctive species of
statute—a state-enacted Uniform Act. These statutes are first drafted by the
Uniform Law Commission (ULC) and then enacted by state legislatures.1 A
quasi-public legislative body constituted by members appointed under state law,
the ULC drafts and promulgates for enactment by the states model statutes “on
subjects on which uniformity across the states is desirable and practicable.”2
Americans encounter Uniform Acts all the time. They help to structure our
life cycles, from birth and adoption to marriage, divorce, and death.3 Broadly
adopted Uniform Acts govern, among other things, parentage, child custody,
premarital and marital agreements, inheritance, and even the definition of what
it means to be legally deceased.4 Our daily commercial dealings, too, are shaped
by the ULC’s work, including the Uniform Commercial Code, which governs
the sale of goods and secured transactions,5 and the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act, the foundation for trillions of dollars in digital commerce.6
Because the ULC’s work is integral to contemporary life, the task of developing

1
FAQs: What Is the Uniform Law Commission?, UNIF. L. COMM’N [hereinafter ULC, FAQs: What Is
the Uniform Law Commission], https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/faq#What%20is%20the%20Uniform%
20Law%20Commission? (last visited May 11, 2022). The ULC has historically been known as the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).
2
Id.
3
One measure of increased recent attention to the importance of Uniform Acts is Professor Thomas W.
Mitchell’s selection as a recipient of the MacArthur Foundation’s “genius” grant for his work as the reporter for
the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act, designed to address abuses in the partition of property held via
tenancies in common. See Thomas Wilson Mitchell, MACARTHUR FOUND., https://www.macfound.org/fellows/
class-of-2020/thomas-wilson-mitchell (last visited May 11, 2022); Thomas W. Mitchell, Restoring Hope for
Heirs Property Owners: The Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act, 40 STATE & LOC. L. NEWS 6, 6 (2016).
Recent editions of the Bluebook also reflect increased awareness of the ULC’s role in statutory drafting. See,
e.g., THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 12.9.4, at 131 (Columbia L. Rev. et al. eds., 21st ed.
2020) (instructing that, “[w]hen citing to a uniform act itself, and not as the law of a particular state,” writers
should “cite it as a separate code” and “[i]ndicate the author’s name parenthetically,” and giving as an example
“UNIF. TR. CODE § 105 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000)”).
4
See, e.g., UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 3 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2009); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION AND ENF’T ACT § 101 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1997); UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1
(UNIF. L. COMM’N 1980); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 102(1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973); UNIF.
PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 3 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2012); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-102 (UNIF.
L. COMM’N 2010); UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT § 2 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1993).
5
U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1951); U.C.C. § 9-101 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L.
COMM’N 2010).
6
See UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 6 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1999).
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a comprehensive, theoretically sound approach to interpreting state-enacted
Uniform Acts is critical. This Article begins that work.7
Our central claim is that state-enacted Uniform Acts are meaningfully
different from conventional statutes in ways that bear directly on how they
should be interpreted. Start with content. Every Uniform Act includes a
provision that directs courts to give “consideration” to “promot[ing] uniformity
of the law” in construing the text.8 And every Uniform Act is promulgated by
the ULC as an integrated package of both blackletter text and official
explanatory comments. Much like a user manual, the comments elaborate how
the text is meant to operate, discussing the provision’s purpose and intended
meaning.9 The enactment process is also different. Unlike the standard
Schoolhouse Rock legislative model,10 in which state lawmakers craft and then
enact bespoke statutory language, a state-enacted Uniform Act follows a twostep model in which legislatures either accept the ULC’s off-the-rack terms or
modify them.11 Often, a legislature will simply enact the ULC’s text—including
the promote-uniformity language—verbatim.
For nontextualists (whether intentionalists or purposivists), these features
that distinguish Uniform Acts from other kinds of statutes are largely congenial
to the interpretive enterprise.12 Nontextualists are increasingly attentive to the
7
In so doing, this Article builds on a growing literature that seeks to move the field of statutory
interpretation beyond an exclusive focus on federal courts and the federal lawmaking process. See, e.g., Abbe
R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New
Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010) (state statutes); Tara Leigh Grove, Presidential Laws and the
Missing Interpretive Theory, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 877 (2020) (presidential directives); Lumen N. Mulligan &
Glen Staszewski, Civil Rules Interpretive Theory, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2167 (2017) (Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure); Jennifer Nou, Regulatory Textualism, 65 DUKE L.J. 81 (2015) (agency regulations); Kevin M.
Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355 (2012) (same); Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of
“Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995) (statutes promulgated
via ballot initiative). The Article also contributes to a growing recognition that not all statutes are drafted by
lawmakers themselves. See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 583 (2002) (finding that even in Congress, “lobbyists are
regularly involved in drafting”). Indeed, because states are increasingly becoming sites of methodological
interpretive innovation, examining state interpretive practice can reshape the assumptions underlying academic
debates over statutory interpretation and thereby “bring to the fore an entirely new category of methodological
questions.” Gluck, supra, at 1862.
8
See, e.g., UNIF. TR. CODE § 1101 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (“In applying and construing this Uniform
Act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter
among States that enact it.”).
9
See infra Part I.B.
10
See I’m Just a Bill, WIKIPEDIA, https://perma.cc/X97T-47AS (last visited Apr. 21, 2022).
11
See infra Part I.C.
12
In using the terms “intentionalism” and “purposivism” and grouping them together, we follow the
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specific features of particular legislative processes.13 The ULC’s expression of
its intent or purpose via the comments provides useful information about what
the statute’s drafters wanted it to do.14 The same goes for the promote-uniformity
clause, which can help interpreters identify “how the particular statute … fit[s]
into the legal system as a whole.”15 For nontextualists, therefore, the official
comments to a Uniform Act slot in easily as persuasive authorities to the
statute’s intended purpose and meaning.
Things look quite different for textualists. In using this term (like
purposivism or intentionalism), we are describing in broad strokes what is an
increasingly rich and diverse interpretive approach.16 Nevertheless, textualists
standard conventions of the literature on statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable
Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 124 (2009) (characterizing the central debate among
statutory interpretation theorists as “between textualists on the one side and intentionalists and purposivists on
the other”); Michael Francus, Digital Realty, Legislative History, and Textualism After Scalia, 46 PEPP. L. REV.
511, 513 (2019) (emphasizing the role of legislative history in the debate between purposivists and textualists).
As reflected in the moniker, purposivists seek to discern a statute’s purpose(s). See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR.
& ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (instructing interpreters to “[d]ecide what purpose
ought to be attributed to the statute and to any subordinate provision of it”); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING
STATUTES 31 (2014) (“The task of the judge is to make sense of legislation in a way that is faithful to Congress’s
purposes.”); Stack, supra note 7, at 385 (making a similar argument as to Congress’s formal statements of
purpose). Meanwhile, intentionalists prioritize (at least when compared to textualists) the intentions of the
enacting legislature. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 351–52 (2005)
(“[I]ntentionalists call upon courts to try to enforce the directives that members of the enacting legislature
understood themselves to be adopting.”).
13
See, e.g., KATZMANN, supra note 12, at 54 (arguing in favor of “discern[ing] legislative meaning” by
“drawing upon the materials of the legislative process”); VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING
DEMOCRACY 2 (2016) (arguing that American lawyers need to develop “greater understanding about how
Congress works”).
14
See HART & SACKS, supra note 12, at 1377 (counseling that interpreters should “accept[]” any
“formally enacted statement of purpose”); KATZMANN, supra note 12, at 31 (arguing that “the fundamental task
for the judge is to determine what Congress was trying to do in passing the law”).
15
HART & SACKS, supra note 12, at 1377.
16
As is true of any mature area of scholarly inquiry, textualism is increasingly characterized by robust
within-tradition debate. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 267 (2020)
(describing interpretive divisions within textualism). A salient contemporary example is the Supreme Court’s
decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), which exposed disagreements about the
assumptions and principles that undergird textualist interpretation, including about what it means to apply the
original public meaning of a statute. Compare id. at 1750 (arguing that the dissenting justices’ view amounted
to the contention that “few in 1964 expected [the] result” that Title VII protects against discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation), with id. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[i]n 1964, ordinary Americans
reading the text of Title VII” would have understood the phrase “discrimination because of ‘sex’” as
“discrimination because of a person’s biological sex, not sexual orientation or gender identity”). See generally,
e.g., Josh Blackman & Randy Barnett, Justice Gorsuch’s Halfway Textualism Surprises and Disappoints in the
Title VII Cases, NAT’L REV. (June 26, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/06/justice-gorsuch-titlevii-cases-half-way-textualism-surprises-disappoints/ (criticizing the majority’s decision from a textualist
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share some foundational understandings about how to interpret a statute.17 In
particular, textualists tend to deny that materials other than the statutory text,
including legislative history, may be used to determine the statute’s meaning.18
For textualists of all stripes, therefore, the official comments to Uniform Acts
would seem to be out of bounds.
Not so. Put in its most provocative form, our claim is that textualism’s core
commitments require textualists interpreting an enacted Uniform Act to treat the
Act’s official comments as persuasive guides to the state’s meaning.19 More
specifically, we argue that when a legislature enacts a Uniform Act unmodified,
the statute’s promote-uniformity provision directs courts to ascribe juridical
status to the official comments of an enacted Uniform Act. The text itself
requires courts to treat the commentary as persuasive (albeit not binding)
authority in interpreting a state-enacted Uniform Act.20
Of course, a legislature need not adopt the ULC’s promulgated text
wholesale. It may modify the ULC’s text. These modifications may be minor,
such as tinkering with the language to fit the state’s drafting conventions, or
major, including explicit rejection of key statutory terms because of outright
policy disagreement.21 In either case, we contend, the statutory text charges
perspective); Mitchell N. Berman & Guha Krishnamurthi, Bostock Was Bogus: Textualism, Pluralism, and Title
VII, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 67, 72 (2021) (arguing that the majority’s decision was inconsistent with textualist
principles); Nelson Lund, Unleashed and Unbound: Living Textualism in Bostock v. Clayton County, 21
FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 158, 167 (2020) (calling Bostock’s “application of textualis[m] . . . fatally flawed”).
So, too, across the states, there are differences in how textualist theory has been implemented. See, e.g., Gluck,
supra note 7, at 1755–56. For a recent critique of textualism as fundamentally indeterminate, see Cary Franklin,
Living Textualism, 2021 SUP. CT. REV. 119 (discussing the Bostock decision).
17
See infra Part II.
18
See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 33 (2012) [hereinafter SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW] (arguing that the “purpose” of the text “is to
be gathered only from the text itself”); id. at 388 (“[U]se of legislative history is not just wrong; it violates
constitutional requirements of nondelegability, bicameralism, presidential participation, and the supremacy of
judicial interpretation in deciding the case presented.”); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 31 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION] (“I object to the use of legislative history on principle, since I reject the intent of the legislature
as the proper criterion of the law.”); see also KATZMANN, supra note 12, at 39 (reflecting that “[t]extualism . . .
involves an assault on the dependence on any extratextual source in determining statutory meaning,” with
“[l]egislative history . . . a central target”).
19
See infra Part III.A.
20
Cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085,
2090 (2002) (contending that Congress may and should promulgate interpretive rules); Kevin M. Stack,
Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 871 (2015)
(defending a “purposivist theory of agency statutory interpretation” on the ground that “[r]egulatory statutes . . .
impose a duty on agencies to carry out [their] powers in accordance with the principles or purposes the statutes
establish”).
21
See infra Part I.C.
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courts with assessing the strength of the signal the legislature sends by adopting
some portion of the ULC’s language.22 The stronger the signal—that is, the less
the enacted text departs from the Uniform Act—the more that textualist
commitments point to treating the ULC’s accompanying commentary as
persuasive (but again, not binding) authority. Put another way, the more of the
Uniform Act the legislature adopts, the stronger the inference that, by virtue of
enacting these words rather than some alternative, the text’s meaning at the time
of its enactment by the state reflects whatever meaning the ULC ascribed to that
text.
This argument has significant practical stakes. Textualism is today’s
reigning interpretive approach.23 But courts have struggled to find a consistent
way to fit Uniform Acts into a textualist framework. Some have overlooked the
distinctive nature of state-enacted Uniform Acts, treating them like bespoke,
Schoolhouse Rock statutes. Thus, for instance, in a case involving a provision
taken verbatim from the Uniform Probate Code, the Alabama Supreme Court
warned, “[W]e are not at liberty to ponder whether and how the legislature might
have written the statute differently to further its intention in the case now before
us.”24 By not recognizing that the legislature enacted the ULC’s text wholesale,
22

See infra Part III.B.
See Harv. L. Sch., The 2015 Scalia Lecture | A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of
Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg (“[W]e’re all textualists
now . . . .”) (timestamp: 8:28); see also, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative
Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532 (2013) (“[V]irtually all theorists and judges are ‘textualists,’ in the sense
that all consider the text the starting point for statutory interpretation and follow statutory plain meaning if the
text is clear.”); Gluck, supra note 7, at 1758 (characterizing textualism as the “controlling interpretive approach”
in many states). One way to appreciate textualism’s ascendance is to see how deeply textualist critiques have
penetrated opponents’ own arguments and assumptions. Cf. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (discussing the success textualists have had in discrediting purposivism). Both
textualists and nontextualists “alike give every indication of caring both about the meaning intended by the
enacting legislature and about the need for readers to have fair notice of that meaning, as well as about some
additional policy-oriented goals.” Nelson, supra note 12, at 353. John Manning, Dean of Harvard Law School
and today’s leading academic textualist, similarly observes that contemporary nontextualists all “pay close
attention to text, structure, sources of technical or specialized meaning, and maxims of [statutory] construction.”
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 85 (2006) [hereinafter
Manning, What Divides]. Abbe Gluck and Richard Posner suggest another way to measure the increasing
influence of textualism. They note that younger judges—those who went to law schools in the 1980s or later—
are more subject to the “general influence of formalism” than their older colleagues. Abbe R. Gluck & Richard
A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1312 (2018). Gluck and Posner comment, “Trends in legal education,
including the new courses in statutory interpretation that tend to highlight the influence of textualism on the
field, alongside the virtual disappearance of legal process theory from most American law school curricula, are
likely playing an important role in this generational shift.” Id.; see also Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen,
Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 793 (2018) (arguing that “most judges begin the interpretive
inquiry with the words of a statute”).
24
Gray v. Gray, 947 So. 2d 1045, 1050 (Ala. 2006) (emphasis added).
23
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these courts risk maladroit application of textualist principles, such as looking
to unrelated nonuniform statutes to give meaning to a similar term, while
remaining oblivious to answers given in the official comments.25 Such an
approach, we argue, is inconsistent with the legislature’s choice to enact the
ULC’s text rather than another text.26 For these courts, our analysis reconciles
the superficial tension between textualist theory on the one hand and treating the
official comments as persuasive authority on the other.
Other courts, in contrast, have recognized that the distinctive content and
two-step political economy of a state-enacted Uniform Act have important
interpretive consequences. Thus, some courts, including the U.S. Supreme
Court, have relied on the accompanying commentary to shed light on the
meaning of a state-enacted Uniform Act.27 But these courts have done so
haltingly and ad hoc, lacking a conceptual architecture and accompanying
vocabulary to justify their approach.28 The closest they come are statements such
as this one from the New Hampshire Supreme Court: “When interpreting a
uniform law . . . ‘the intention of the drafters of a uniform act becomes the
legislative intent upon enactment.’”29 For these courts, our approach provides a
conceptual foundation to ground their interpretive instincts. While some courts
now hold that they may look to the comments because they are interpreting text
that began life as part of a Uniform Act,30 we show that on textualist grounds
they must do so.
Against this backdrop, we propose a new canon of construction for textualist
courts confronting uncertain statutory language originating in a Uniform Act.
Courts should first determine whether the provision at issue is part of a stateenacted Uniform Act and whether it is governed by a promote-uniformity clause.
If so, they should acknowledge the legislature’s textual directive by treating the
official comments as persuasive guides to the provision’s meaning. In the
absence of a promote-uniformity clause, courts should treat the comments as
persuasive authority in proportion to the strength of the legislature’s signal,

25
See infra Part III.C. They also risk methodological inconsistency across cases. See, e.g., Norwood v.
Barclay, 298 So. 3d 1051, 1054–55 (Ala. 2019) (observing that the provision at issue was “modeled” on a
provision in the Uniform Probate Code and considering the comment accompanying that provision).
26
See infra Parts III.A, III.B.
27
See, e.g., Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1821 (2018) (citing comment to § 2-804 of the Uniform
Probate Code).
28
See infra Parts III.C, IV.
29
Hodges v. Johnson, 177 A.3d 86, 93 (N.H. 2017) (quoting In re Ball & Ball, 123 A.3d 719, 722 (2015)).
30
See, e.g., William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
539, 540 (2017) (observing that “[m]any tenets of statutory interpretation . . . allow consideration of outside
information . . . only if the statute’s text is unclear or ambiguous”).
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assessing the closeness of the provision as enacted to the version as promulgated
by the ULC. The smaller the legislature’s departure from the ULC’s
promulgated text, the stronger the signal that the comments should be treated as
persuasive guides to the statute’s meaning.
Finally, we present a series of puzzles and complications arising from
“hybrid” cases in which the legislature combines Uniform and bespoke texts.
These statutes are difficult to interpret because a legislature’s choice to draw on
the ULC’s text abrades against other types of textual evidence. Consider two
examples. What if a legislature updates preexisting statutory language by
inserting language from a Uniform Act, giving rise to a hybrid statute that
includes both legacy and Uniform text? What if a legislature omits some of the
Uniform text without enacting a substitute provision? These and other similarly
thorny questions are complex admixtures, difficult to place on the spectrum from
fully customized statutory language to wholesale adoption of the ULC’s
statutory terms. The ambiguous nature of the legislature’s signal makes them
difficult (if not impossible) to resolve conclusively. For these questions, our aim
is to identify and frame, teeing them up for further analysis. We also consider
how courts should treat the ULC’s internal legislative history, including early
drafts or floor statements by commissioners, and why they are different from the
official comments that accompany a promulgated act.
While beyond the scope of this paper, our analysis bears on other sources of
domestic and international positive law that, like Uniform Acts, also contain user
manuals in the form of accompanying commentary. For instance, the advisory
notes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence
are often treated as persuasive sources of authority when interpreting the
blackletter text.31 Indeed, the Supreme Court has observed that the notes are
“particularly relevant” when Congress makes no changes to the Advisory
Committee’s initial draft of the rules—a similar two-step drafting process to the
one that produces state-enacted Uniform Acts.32 But the Court has not provided

31
See, e.g., Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160 (1995) (explaining that the Supreme Court “relie[s]”
on the “well-considered [Advisory] Notes as a useful guide in ascertaining the meaning of the [Federal] Rules
[of Evidence]”); Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986) (holding that the “construction given by the
[Advisory] Committee” to a provision of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “is ‘of weight’”) (quoting
Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946)); Oviedo v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 948
F.3d 386, 396 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (considering the advisory notes accompanying the 2010 revision to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1158 (2002) (arguing that the Advisory Committee Notes to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are authoritative source materials for textualists).
32
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 165 n.9 (1988).
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a conceptual frame for why the notes are especially relevant in such
circumstances.33 Our analysis could be adapted in future work to fill that void.34
International law also contains relevant analogues. For example, much like
the ULC in the domestic context, the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) was established in the mid-1960s “to
further the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international
trade.”35 Provisions of the U.S. Code adopting UNCITRAL’s model laws,
including chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, contain direct analogues to the
ULC’s promote-uniformity clauses.36 And UNCITRAL’s model laws are
accompanied by “travaux préparatoires”—rough equivalents of the ULC’s
comments. These materials are often treated by domestic courts as important
guides to the intended operation of the blackletter text.37 Our conceptual
framework may therefore be readily adapted for interpreting model acts
promulgated by the ULC’s international equivalents.
33
For instance, though Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 553
(1988), which treated the Advisory Committee’s Notes on Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as
authoritative sources of legislative intent, id. at 562, he revisited the issue in a later concurrence. He wrote the
following:

Having been prepared by a body of experts, the Notes are assuredly persuasive scholarly
commentaries—ordinarily the most persuasive—concerning the meaning of the rules. But they
bear no special authoritativeness as the work of the draftsmen, any more than the views of
Alexander Hamilton (a draftsman) bear more authority than the views of Thomas Jefferson (not
a draftsman) with regard to the meaning of the Constitution. It is the words of the Rules that have
been authoritatively adopted—by this Court, or by Congress if it makes a statutory change.
Tome, 513 U.S. at 167 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
34
Our approach also has potential state-level extensions. For example, when interpreting state law,
California state courts often look to the comments made by the state’s Law Revision Commission. See, e.g., Est.
of Eimers v. Eimers, 262 Cal. Rptr. 3d 639, 642–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020), review denied (July 29, 2020). The
Commission is an “independent state agency,” whose mission is to “assist[] the Legislature and Governor by
examining California law and recommending needed reforms. See General Information, CALIF. L. REVISION
COMM’N, http://www.clrc.ca.gov (last visited May 11, 2021).
35
Frequently Asked Questions—Mandate and History, UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L.,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/about/faq/mandate_composition/history (last visited May 11, 2022). Our thanks to
John Pottow and Tim Schnabel for drawing our attention to this issue.
36
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (implementing domestically UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency and providing that “[i]n interpreting this chapter, the court shall consider its international origin, and
the need to promote an application of this chapter that is consistent with the application of similar statutes
adopted by foreign jurisdictions”); Convention on Int’l Interests in Mobile Equip., art. 5.1., Nov. 16, 2001,
T.I.A.S. 06-301.2, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285 (ratified by the United States as a self-executing treaty) (“In the
interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its purposes as set forth in the preamble, to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity and predictability in its application.”).
37
See, e.g., Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) (“Because a treaty ratified by
the United States is not only the law of this land, . . . but also an agreement among sovereign powers, we have
traditionally considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiating and drafting history (travaux préparatoires)
. . . .”).
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the unique
content and political economy of state-enacted Uniform Acts, beginning with
the ULC’s drafting process and ending with enactment at the state level. Part II
provides a brief overview of textualist theory, identifying foundational
assumptions common across textualism’s various flavors. Part III turns to the
consequences of the distinctive content and two-step political economy of
Uniform Acts for textualist theory. In developing our proposed interpretive
canon, we focus first on a legislature’s decision to enact a Uniform Act without
modification, including the promote-uniformity clause, and then turn to the
complications that result when the legislature omits the promote-uniformity
clause. Part IV explores a series of challenging hybrid cases and other puzzles
that arise outside the heartland of a clean enactment of a full Uniform Act. A
brief conclusion follows.
I.

THE MAKING OF UNIFORM ACTS

We begin with a primer on the making of Uniform Acts, including the ULC’s
history, institutional structure, and operating procedures. We then turn to an
overview of the two-step process for a Uniform Act to become a state statute.
A. The Origins and Influence of the ULC
The ULC “is best described as a legislative drafting consortium of the state
governments, operating in fields of law in which multi-state contacts or multistate concerns make uniformity desirable.”38 The organization owes its origins
to the United States’ rapid industrialization in the postbellum period.39 In 1889,
American Bar Association president David D. Field, whose work in spurring the
codification of New York procedural law is often credited with promoting a
distinctively American mode of trans-substantive civil procedure, created a

38
John H. Langbein, Major Reforms of the Property Restatement and the Uniform Probate Code:
Reformation, Harmless Error, and Nonprobate Transfers, 38 ACTEC L.J. 1, 3 (2012). It receives the “major
portion of its financial support” from state appropriations. See UNIF. L. COMM’N, REFERENCE BOOK 13–14
(2020-2021) [hereinafter ULC, REFERENCE BOOK].
39
See generally ROBERT A. STEIN, FORMING A MORE PERFECT UNION: A HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW
COMMISSION 133 (2013) [hereinafter STEIN, MORE PERFECT UNION] (explaining that after the Civil War there
was a “need for more uniform and predictable state laws as industrialization increased and commercial relations
among states expanded”); Robert A. Stein, Strengthening Federalism: The Uniform State Law Movement in the
United States, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2253, 2255 (2015) [hereinafter Stein, Strengthening Federalism] (noting that
the American Bar Association was in part created because of “the need to promote greater uniformity of state
law”).
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“Special Committee on Uniformity of State Legislation.”40 In response, six
states—Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania—created commissions on uniform laws.41
These efforts bore fruit with the first meeting of the ULC, then known as the
Conference of State Uniform Law Commissioners, in Saratoga, New York, on
August 24, 1892.42 Twelve representatives from seven states attended.43 Two
years later, state representation had more than tripled, with representatives from
twenty-two states attending the ULC’s August 1894 meeting.44 In 1896, the
ULC adopted its first legislative product, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law, ultimately enacted in every state, territory, and the District of Columbia.45
By 1900, the ULC boasted a membership of thirty-five states and territories,
with all forty-eight states, as well as Alaska, Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto
Rico joining by 1912.46
During its first several decades, several giants of American law and politics,
such as John Barr Ames, Louis Brandeis, Roscoe Pound, John Wigmore, Samuel
Williston, and Woodrow Wilson, served as commissioners.47 In later years, a
new generation of luminaries has taken on this responsibility, including Chief
Justice William Rehnquist and Associate Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and
David Souter, as well as former Solicitor General Ted Olson.48
The ULC has had a significant hand in shaping American law. The Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), often called the ULC’s “crown jewel,” emerged in
the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Erie decision and Congress’s failure to
pass a federal statute governing interstate sales transactions.49 A statute every
first-year law student studies, the UCC “governs a major share of the
commercial transactions in all jurisdictions in the country.”50 In the postwar era,
40
STEIN, MORE PERFECT UNION, supra note 39, at 5. On Field’s influence, see AMALIA D. KESSLER,
INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, 18001877, at 144–50 (2017).
41
STEIN, MORE PERFECT UNION, supra note 39, at 6.
42
Id. at 7.
43
Id.; Stein, Strengthening Federalism, supra note 39, at 2256.
44
STEIN, MORE PERFECT UNION, supra note 39, at 9.
45
Id. at 9; Stein, Strengthening Federalism, supra note 39, at 2258.
46
STEIN, MORE PERFECT UNION, supra note 39, at 11, 21; Stein, Strengthening Federalism, supra note
39, at 2256.
47
STEIN, MORE PERFECT UNION, supra note 39, at 33–35, 226.
48
Id. at 285–86, 288, 317.
49
Id. at 80–81; Stein, Strengthening Federalism, supra note 39, at 2262. In fairness, the UCC was a joint
project of the ULC with the American Law Institute. See Uniform Commercial Code, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/acts/ucc (last visited May 10, 2022).
50
Stein, Strengthening Federalism, supra note 39, at 2266.
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the ULC has also been responsible for advancing the development—and the
statutory codification—of laws governing marriage, divorce, reproduction,
adoption, child custody, and inheritance, as well as providing additional
commercial infrastructure, including for electronic transactions.51 Thus,
“[e]very day, when a person conducts business, enters a contract, makes a
purchase or sale, obtains or transfers property, or takes care of a family matter,
it is likely that a ULC law applies.”52
B. Step One: The ULC Drafting Process
Formal authority to approve a Uniform Act lies with the ULC’s
Commissioners, who are typically appointed by state governors, but
occasionally by state legislatures or other state officials, as prescribed by state
statute.53 Owing to their appointment by elected political officials, ULC
Commissioners are, like federal judges, indirectly subject to the “electoral
connection.”54 States may appoint as many Commissioners as authorized by
state law.55 In the ULC’s plenary sessions, however, each state (including the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) is allocated only
one vote.56
1. Scope and Program
The process of drafting and promulgating a Uniform Act begins with the
ULC’s Committee on Scope and Program, which has formal “responsibility to

51

See supra note 4 (giving examples of Uniform Acts).
ULC, FAQs: What Is the Uniform Law Commission, supra note 1.
53
Langbein, supra note 38, at 3 n.7.
54
See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5–6 (2d ed. 2004)
(arguing that members of Congress are “single-minded seekers of reelection”). Commissioners are, in the first
instance, members of state-level Commissions on Uniform State Laws. They serve without compensation. See
ULC, REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 38, at 14. This feature, scholars have argued, “removes the
commissionerships from pressures for political patronage.” JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER &
BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 856 (2009).
55
Langbein, supra note 38, at 3 n.7; About ULC: Overview, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.
org/aboutulc/overview (last visited May 11, 2022) (“Each jurisdiction determines the method of appointment
and the number of commissioners actually appointed.”).
56
See Constitution, UNIF. L. COMM’N [hereinafter ULC, Constitution], https://www.uniformlaws.org/
aboutulc/constitution (last visited May 11, 2022) (§ 8.02); FAQs: How Does an Act Receive Final ULC
Approval?, UNIF. L. COMM’N [hereinafter FAQs: How Does an Act Receive Final ULC Approval], https://www.
uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/faq#How%20does%20an%20act%20receive%20final%C2%A0ULC%20approval?
(last visited May 11, 2022).
52
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determine whether [a] subject merits consideration by the ULC.”57 The
committee solicits proposals several times a year, with the bulk coming from
ULC commissioners.58
Proposals must satisfy two main criteria. First, the subject matter “must be
appropriate for state legislation in view of the powers granted by the Constitution
. . . to Congress.”59 Second, the subject matter “must be such that approval of
the act . . . would be consistent with the objectives of the ULC . . . ‘to promote
uniformity in the law among the several States on subjects where uniformity is
desirable and practicable.’”60 Several additional factors guide the committee’s
consideration, including: (1) “[w]hether there [is] a need for an act on the
subject”; (2) the “probability” that, if promulgated, a Uniform Act on the subject
“either will be accepted and enacted into law by a substantial number of states
or, if not, will promote uniformity indirectly”; and (3) possible “benefits to the
public,” including “facilitating interstate economic, social, or political relations”
and “avoiding significant disadvantages likely to arise from diversity of state
law.”61
Ultimately, proposals that receive the Committee on Scope and Program’s
recommendation are forwarded to the ULC’s Executive Committee, which
“must find that a proposed act: (A) comports with the criteria of the ULC; (B)
has the potential . . . of substantially contributing to the objectives of the ULC;

57
Statement of Policy Establishing Criteria and Procedures for Designation and Consideration of
Uniform and Model Acts, UNIF. L. COMM’N [hereinafter ULC, Statement of Policy], https://www.uniformlaws.
org/projects/overview/newprojectcriteria (last visited May 11, 2022) (“Whenever a subject for an act is proposed
to the ULC, the proposal must first be submitted to the Committee on Scope and Program . . . .”); see also ULC,
REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 38, at 14 (“Proposals that uniform acts be drafted, received from many sources,
are referred to a Committee on Scope and Program . . . .”); FAQs: How Are Subjects for New Acts Selected?,
UNIF. L. COMM’N [hereinafter FAQS: How Are Subjects for New Acts Selected], https://www.uniformlaws.org/
aboutulc/faq#How%20are%20subjects%20for%20new%20acts%20selected? (last visited May 11, 2022) (“The
ULC Committee on Scope and Program welcomes proposals from state bars, state government entities, private
groups, uniform law commissioners, and private individuals. The committee may assign a proposal to a Study
Committee, which researches the topic and decides whether to recommend that an act be drafted. . . . An
approved recommendation leads to creation of a ULC Drafting Committee.”). Section 4.04 of the ULC
Constitution provides that “[t]he Committee shall recommend to the Executive Committee the work the
Conference should undertake and the general plan and scope of its activities.” ULC, Constitution, supra note 56
(§ 4.04). The Committee is appointed by the ULC’s president and consists of nine members. Id.
58
New Project Proposals, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/projects/overview/newproject
proposal (last visited May 11, 2022).
59
ULC, Statement of Policy, supra note 57.
60
Id. (quoting ULC, Constitution, supra note 56 (§ 1.02)).
61
Id.
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and (C) will have adequate agenda time for its consideration.”62 If approved, a
ULC Drafting Committee is formed.63
2. Drafting Committees and Plenary Sessions
ULC drafting committees are comprised of a chair (herself a ULC
commissioner), several additional commissioners, and a reporter—almost
always a member of the legal academy and an expert in the relevant subject
matter.64 An advisor from the American Bar Association (ABA) is usually
assigned.65 The chair is responsible for coordinating with the drafting
committee’s assigned ABA advisor, whose role “is to solicit input from all parts
of the ABA that may have an interest in the act and to discuss the drafts of the
act with those constituencies.”66
Both to win the support of key constituencies and to tap into additional
expertise, relevant interest groups are typically invited to participate in the
drafting process. As the ULC explains, “A key group or constituency that is not
aware of the project may later oppose the act, while inclusion of all groups and
constituencies will provide an opportunity for consensus and facilitate
enactment.”67 Committee chairs, often in concert with the reporter, are
responsible for “[i]dentifying and contacting relevant stakeholders to seek their
participation” in the drafting process.68 Though not formally granted a vote,
62

Id.; FAQS: How Are Subjects for New Acts Selected, supra note 57.
FAQS: How Are Subjects for New Acts Selected, supra note 57.
64
See Unif. L. Comm’n, Committee Procedure Manual 1–10 (2021) [hereinafter ULC, Committee
Procedure Manual] (unpublished manual) (describing the work and operating procedures of drafting committees)
(on file with authors); Langbein, supra note 38, at 6 (“When the Commission does decide to draft a uniform law,
. . . [it] appoints a drafting committee, composed of commissioners, to work with a reporter, who is commonly
a specialist academic.”); ULC, REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 38, at 14 (“If the ULC decides to accept a subject,
a special committee of commissioners is appointed to prepare a draft of an act.”). Formally, the ULC’s
Constitution provides that special committees are appointed by the president, who “specif[ies] the number of
their members, and designate[s] their chairpersons.” ULC, Constitution, supra note 56 (§ 5.02).
65
See ULC, Constitution, supra note 56 (§ 2.09(a)) (“The Executive Committee may appoint as advisory
members of the Conference representatives from the American Bar Association, the American Law Institute, or
governmental organization or agencies designated by the Executive Committee.”); Bylaws, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/constitution (last visited May 11, 2022) (§ 10.01) (“During the preparation of an
Act, the Special Committee having it under consideration shall notify and confer with the appropriate committee
or section of the American Bar Association or, in the absence of an appropriate committee or section, with the
Secretary of the Association.”).
66
Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State L., Guidelines for Drafting Committee Chairs 3 (rev. ed. Feb.
2007) [hereinafter NCCUSL, Drafting Chair Guidelines] (unpublished guidelines) (on file with authors); ULC,
Committee Procedure Manual, supra note 64, at 4 (“The ULC (via the president or executive director) requests
ABA participation in an advisory capacity for every study and drafting committee.”).
67
ULC, Committee Procedure Manual, supra note 64, at 3.
68
Id. at 1.
63
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designated group-affiliated observers are urged to attend and participate in
drafting sessions.69 To ensure representativeness, members of the drafting
committee are encouraged to “determine whether additional organizations are
likely to support or may oppose an act and thus should be invited to
participate.”70
For critics of the drafting process, such as Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott,
interest group involvement constrains the scope of the ULC’s work, creating a
“strong status quo bias” and raising the prospect of interest-group capture.71
Larry Ribstein and Bruce Kobayashi similarly suggest that the ULC “provides
camouflage for interest group legislation.”72 In their view, “the drafting process
may be biased toward business rather than consumer groups,” particularly
because business groups—unlike consumer groups—are likely to benefit from
“scope economies of representation.”73
Not all scholars view the involvement of interest groups in the enactment
process as a negative, however. Some, such as John Langbein and Lawrence
Waggoner, argue that interest group buy-in ensures that the ULC’s work
achieves its intended goals. On their account, interest groups guarantee that “real
lawyers [are] put in charge of the academics.”74 Because “[u]niform laws are
political orphans[,] . . . [t]he ideal is to identify relevant interests and to satisfy
their concerns . . . in order to have a legislative product that takes account of the
real problems and that does not beget needless opposition.”75

69
NCCUSL, Drafting Chair Guidelines, supra note 66, at 3; ULC, Committee Procedure Manual, supra
note 64, at 6 (“Observers are invited to attend committee meetings . . . and may participate in the discussions at
those meetings. Written comments from observers are also welcomed . . . .”).
70
ULC, Committee Procedure Manual, supra note 64, at 3.
71
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
595, 650–51 (1995).
72
Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 131, 147 (1996).
73
Id. at 143. Kathleen Patchel, too, argues that “the history of the [UCC] raises the concern that the
uniform laws process simply may be unable to accommodate the interests of consumers at all because provisions
protecting consumer interests routinely have been excluded to avoid the possibility that their inclusion would
impair enactment.” Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some
Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 124 (1993). Patchel adds that the ULC’s
“focus on enactment, and the concomitant need to enlist the support of others in order to have its law enacted”
fundamentally constrains the nature of ULC’s interventions. Id. at 92.
74
John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reforming the Law of Gratuitous Transfers: The New
Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALA. L. REV. 871, 876 (1992).
75
Id. at 877.
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In any event, once a drafting committee is in place, drafting begins in earnest
and ordinarily lasts two years.76 Meetings take place twice a year—once in the
fall and once in the spring—and typically involve a line-by-line discussion of
the draft blackletter text.77 The chair moderates the discussion, supported by the
reporter, and decisions are usually reached by consensus.78 The draft is then
presented for plenary floor debate at one of the ULC’s annual meetings.79 All
the commissioners are present for this line-by-line reading.80 Normally, a
Uniform Act is formally promulgated only after it has been read on the floor
during two separate annual meetings.81
Responsibility for drafting and revising the blackletter text and the
accompanying comments falls to the reporter, who serves as a “resource for
drafting committees.”82 The reporter also prepares notes to guide committee
members in evaluating the proposed blackletter text.83 Nevertheless, because the
reporter is not typically a member of the ULC, she is not afforded a formal vote
in committee.84 Indeed, the ULC is clear that, “[a]lthough the reporter is the
principal drafter of a uniform act, the process is based on the substantive
decisions of, and collaboration with, the committee.”85
All told, the first step in the life cycle of a state-enacted Uniform Act
resembles its more conventional counterpart. Just as in a traditional legislature,
primary drafting responsibility falls to select individuals—here, the reporter,
sometimes assisted by the chair. Next, a responsible committee performs an
extensive mark-up, carefully scrutinizing the proposed draft over the course of
76
77

Langbein, supra note 38, at 6.
STEIN, MORE PERFECT UNION, supra note 39, at 205; NCCUSL, Drafting Chair Guidelines, supra note

66, at 4.
78
E-mail from Tim Schnabel, Exec. Dir., Unif. L. Comm’n, to Robert H. Sitkoff, Professor of L., Harvard
Univ. (Feb. 27, 2022, 2:11 AM) (confirming the current procedures of the ULC drafting committee) (on file
with authors).
79
See FAQs: How Does an Act Receive Final ULC Approval, supra note 56.
80
See id.; ULC, Constitution, supra note 56 (§ 8.01(a)(1)).
81
See FAQs: How Does an Act Receive Final ULC Approval, supra note 56; ULC, Constitution, supra
note 56 (§ 8.01(a)(2)); ULC, REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 38, at 14. The two-reading rule may be waived on
the floor. ULC, Constitution, supra note 56 (§ 8.01).
82
STEIN, MORE PERFECT UNION, supra note 39, at 205; Lawrence J. Bugge, Theodore J. St. Antoine &
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Tributes to William J. Pierce, Executive Director, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2074 (1991).
83
NCCUSL, Drafting Chair Guidelines, supra note 66, at 2; ULC, Committee Procedure Manual, supra
note 64, at 1 (“Notes are primarily to inform the members of the committee about issues . . . .”).
84
ULC, Committee Procedure Manual, supra note 64, at 6 (“Only commissioners are permitted to vote
officially on committee decisions.”).
85
Id. at 2. For that reason, “[i]n making public comments about the work of the drafting committee or the
act, the reporter should avoid portraying himself or herself as the author of the act and should ensure that his or
her employer does the same (e.g., in any information made available by law libraries).” Id.
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several meetings. Finally, the ULC’s plenary body—with authority to
promulgate the act—conducts a broader review, making modifications as it
deems necessary during a floor debate preceding a vote. This multiyear process
is responsible for the ULC’s principal legislative outputs: the blackletter text and
accompanying official comments.86
3. Drafting Output
The ULC drafting process yields two types of textual outputs. First, the
committee drafts the blackletter portion of a proposed Uniform Act.87 The
blackletter text is subject to the ULC’s style manual, which governs the Act’s
overall structure, as well as the word choice, syntax, and formatting of each
provision.88 The blackletter text must be approved by the ULC and is subject to
the Commission’s majoritarian voting procedures. For the ULC to promulgate a
Uniform Act, a majority of the jurisdictions present (at minimum, twenty) must
vote in favor.89
Crucially, the blackletter text always contains a provision instructing courts
that, “in applying and construing [the] . . . Act, consideration must be given to
promoting uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among States
that enact it.”90 The ULC has included variations on this directive in every

86
Those outputs are typically followed by secondary commentary in the form of a summary article
authored by the reporter, chair, or both. This article typically reflects their view of the Uniform Act’s primary
purpose. ULC, Committee Procedure Manual, supra note 64, at 2 (“Ideally, once the act has been promulgated,
a reporter will also prepare an appropriate article for publication discussing the act, its development, and the
reasons behind its provisions.”); see also, e.g., John D. Morley & Robert H. Sitkoff, Making Directed Trusts
Work: The Uniform Directed Trust Act, 44 ACTEC L.J. 3 (2019) (explaining the Uniform Directed Trust Act);
Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: The Reporters’ Overview, 49 BUS.
LAW. 1 (1993) (explaining the Revised Uniform Partnership Act). In seeking to provide additional “guidance to
readers of the draft [text],” the reporter may describe the assumptions and debates animating the drafting process
and provide additional context for the comments. NCCUSL, Drafting Chair Guidelines, supra note 66, at 2.
87
FAQs: How Is an Act Drafted?, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/faq#How%
20does%20an%20act%20receive%20final%C2%A0ULC%20approval? (last visited May 11, 2022).
88
Unif. L. Comm’n, Drafting Rules and Style Manual 1 (2021) [hereinafter ULC, Drafting Rules]
(unpublished manual) (on file with authors).
89
ULC, REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 38, at 14.
90
See, e.g., UNIF. TR. CODE § 1101 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010); see also ULC, Drafting Rules, supra note
88, at 34 (instructing Uniform Act drafters to include a promote-uniformity clause “[t]o foster uniformity after
enactment”). In 2021, the standard promote-uniformity clause was revised to read as follows: “In applying and
construing this uniform act, a court shall consider the promotion of uniformity of the law among jurisdictions
that enact it.” Id.
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Uniform Act since 1910.91 The blackletter text may also contain bracketed
language communicating to enacting legislatures that some of it is “optional.”92
Second, the committee drafts the official comments that accompany the
blackletter text. Intended for “legislatures, courts, practitioners, and others who
are considering the act for enactment or need to construe or apply it,”93 a
comment typically accompanies each provision.94 Written “to inform ultimate
users of the act about the committee’s intentions,” the official comments
describe the ULC’s reasons for adopting the provision’s blackletter text, the
meaning of key terms, the extent to which the blackletter represents a departure
from the status quo, and important potential criticisms.95 Here is an example,
drawn from section 705 of the Uniform Trust Code (UTC), of how the ULC
packages the blackletter text and official comment together:

91
The first version of this instruction, published in 1906 as Section 74 of the Uniform Sales Act, provides
as follows: “Interpretation shall give effect to purpose of uniformity. This act shall be so interpreted and
construed, as to effect its general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact it.” See E-mail
from Benjamin Orzeske, Chief Couns., Unif. L. Comm’n, to Robert H. Sitkoff, Professor of L., Harvard Univ.
(Oct. 24, 2017, 6:08 PM) (on file with authors). The same language was later used in the Uniform Desertion and
Non-Support Act of 1910 and the Uniform Law Relating to the Cold Storage of Certain Articles of Food of
1914.
92
See, e.g., UNIF. TR. CODE § 411 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (“By the 2004 amendment, [subsection
(c)] was placed in brackets and therefore made optional . . . .”). The ULC’s Drafting Rules provide as follows:
“To indicate that a choice is given to the enacting sate in adopting or omitting language, place the language
affected by the choice within brackets.” ULC, Drafting Rules, supra note 88, at 37.
93
ULC, Committee Procedure Manual, supra note 64, at 9. But “[c]omments are not to be used as a
substitute for or to modify a substantive provision in an act.” Id. Thus, “[t]he statutory text always governs a
conflict or inconsistency between the text and the comments.” Id.
94
The ULC’s practice of providing authoritative commentary began with Karl Llewellyn, the UCC’s
reporter. Laurens Walker, Writings on the Margin of American Law: Committee Notes, Comments, and
Commentary, 29 GA. L. REV. 993, 995 (1995). For Llewellyn, the comments were “an indispensable part of the
UCC framework . . . . [G]iven the intentional flexibility built into the Code, . . . [t]he drafters designed them to
provide a bridge between often confusing or sparse Code language and the facts of specific cases.” Sean Michael
Hannaway, Note, The Jurisprudence and Judicial Treatment of the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code,
75 CORNELL L. REV. 962, 967 (1990).
95
ULC, Committee Procedure Manual, supra note 64, at 1–2.
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SECTION 705. RESIGNATION OF TRUSTEE.
(a) A trustee may resign:
(1) upon at least 30 days’ notice to the qualified beneficiaries, the settlor, if living,
and all cotrustees; or
(2) with the approval of the court.
(b) In approving a resignation, the court may issue orders and impose conditions reasonably
necessary for the protection of the trust property.
(c) Any liability of a resigning trustee or of any sureties on the trustee’s bond for acts or
omissions of the trustee is not discharged or affected by the trustee’s resignation.
Comment
This section rejects the common law rule that a trustee may resign only with permission of
the court, and goes further than the Restatements, which allow a trustee to resign with the consent of
the beneficiaries. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 36 (Tentative Draft No.2, approved 1999);
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 106 (1959). Concluding that the default rule ought to approximate
standard drafting practice, the Drafting Committee provided in subsection (a) that a trustee may
resign by giving notice to the qualified beneficiaries, a living settlor, and any cotrustee. A resigning
trustee may also follow the traditional method and resign with approval of the court.
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 36 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999), and
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 106 cmt. b (1959), provide, similar to subsection (c), that a
resignation does not release the resigning trustee from potential liabilities for acts or omissions while
in office. The act of resignation can give rise to liability if the trustee resigns for the purpose of
facilitating a breach of trust by a cotrustee. See Ream v. Frey, 107 F.3d 147 (3rd Cir. 1997).
Regarding the residual responsibilities of a resigning trustee until the trust property is
delivered to a successor trustee, see Section 707.
In the case of a revocable trust, because the rights of the qualified beneficiaries are subject to
the settlor’s control (see Section 603), resignation of the trustee is accomplished by giving notice to
the settlor instead of the beneficiaries.
2001 Amendment. By a 2001 amendment, subsection (a)(1) was amended to require that
notice of a trustee’s resignation be given to a living settlor. Previously, notice to a living settlor was
required for a revocable but not irrevocable trust. Notice to the settlor of a revocable trust was
required because the rights of the qualified beneficiaries, including the right to receive a trustee’s
resignation, are subject to the settlor’s exclusive control. See Section 603.

Given their importance in construing the blackletter text of the Uniform Act,
individual comments may be subject to robust discussion and debate within the
drafting committee.96 They may also play a role in the bargaining process, as
drafting committee members may condition their approval of certain blackletter
text on the inclusion of certain language in the comments.97 And just as the
blackletter text evolves over the course of the drafting process, so do the
comments.98 Draft comments must be updated to conform to the final version of
the blackletter text as approved by the plenary body at an annual meeting. Thus,
96
E-mail from Tim Schnabel, Exec. Dir., Unif. L. Comm’n, to authors (Dec. 8, 2020, 5:15 PM) (on file
with authors).
97
Id.
98
ULC, Committee Procedure Manual, supra note 64, at 1 (instructing that comments should be “updated
as drafts are revised”).
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“[c]omments are subject to revision by the reporter and chair of the drafting
committee with appropriate consultation . . . up to the time of their official
publication by Thomson Reuters.”99
Admittedly, the official comments depart in several respects from more
familiar models of traditional legislative history like congressional committee
reports. For one, comments are “mostly final,” but not necessarily completed,
“when the act is submitted to the ULC for final approval.”100 But as we have just
seen, this follows from the explanatory function of the comments, which
requires that they be finalized only after the blackletter text is finalized. For
another, there is variation in how closely individual chairs and drafting
committees review the comments as drafted by the reporter. In some cases,
therefore, the comments may elevate (relatively speaking) an individual
reporter’s views about the proposed statute’s intended operation.
Nevertheless, once finalized the comments become inextricable components
of the statutory products the ULC offers. The ULC’s constitution provides that
a Uniform Act “must . . . be accompanied so far as practicable by historical,
explanatory, and tentative official comments.”101 In consequence, state
legislatures deciding whether to enact the Uniform Act (and how much of it to
enact) receive the blackletter text together with the comments as an integrated
package both with the imprimatur of the ULC.102
C. Step Two: State Enactment
After a Uniform Act is promulgated, state legislatures decide whether to
enact it. At this stage, commissioners serve as advocates for the Act’s adoption
in their respective home jurisdictions.103 Here, too, interest groups are often
heavily involved, with some groups holding effective “veto power.”104 Some
Uniform Acts, such as the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act and the Uniform

99
Id. at 9. Comments may be revised after the Uniform Act’s publication, but only “to correct errors,
update references and make non-substantive changes.” Id.; see also ULC, Drafting Rules, supra note 88, at 13
(similar).
100
ULC, Committee Procedure Manual, supra note 64, at 2 (emphasis added).
101
ULC, Constitution, supra note 57 (§ 8.04) (emphasis added).
102
Cf. ULC, Drafting Rules, supra note 88, at 13 (noting that “in some states,” comments “are treated in
some circumstances as a part of the act”).
103
See ULC, Constitution, supra note 57 (§ 6.01(f)) (requiring Commissioners “to seek introduction and
enactment of Uniform Acts promulgated by the Conference that are appropriate for their State”).
104
Langbein, supra note 38, at 6.
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Anatomical Gift Act, enjoy nearly universal enactment.105 Others, such as the
Uniform Marital Property Act, have had few, if any, enactments.106 The
enactment pattern for most Uniform Acts falls somewhere in between.107
When enacting a Uniform Act, legislatures often choose to leave the ULC’s
promulgated text unaltered.108 But they may also choose to alter or amend it.
Often, the modifications are merely cosmetic changes necessary to conform the
text to a state’s legislative conventions. For example, the Legislative Drafting
Manual in Maine observes that “when complex uniform laws are enacted as
Maine statutes, the basic numbering system, the mechanical structure and the
internal organization . . . are usually altered to conform with the Maine Revised
Statutes standards.”109 Recognizing variation in state drafting conventions and
background law, Uniform Acts may contain legislative notes that provide
guidance to states on how to absorb the promulgated act.110
105
See Electronic Transactions Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/
community-home?CommunityKey=2c04b76c-2b7d-4399-977e-d5876ba7e034 (last visited May 11, 2022)
(showing adoption in each of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands); Anatomical
Gift Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=
015e18ad-4806-4dff-b011-8e1ebc0d1d0f (last visited May 11, 2022) (showing adoption in forty-eight states).
106
It has since been recast as a Model rather than Uniform Act. See Model Marital Prop. Act, UNIF. L.
COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=b9e6d3ce-9365-496ebf98-fedd48a35a6a (last visited May 11, 2022).
107
See ULC, REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 38, at 207–15.
108
Indeed, the legislative drafting manuals of several states instruct drafters to depart as little as possible
from the ULC’s promulgated text. See, e.g., ARIZ. LEG. COUNCIL, THE ARIZONA LEGISLATIVE BILL DRAFTING
MANUAL 66 (2020), https://www.azleg.gov/alisPDFs/council/2019-2020_bill_drafting_manual.pdf (“Consistent with
the goal of uniformity, uniform laws should be drafted with as few changes as possible.”); MONT. LEGIS. SERVS.
DIV., BILL DRAFTING MANUAL 9 (2018), https://leg.mt.gov/content/Publications/2018-bill-drafting-manual.pdf
(observing that uniform acts are “intended to be followed exactly in substance”); OR. LEGIS. COUNS. COMM.,
BILL DRAFTING MANUAL 15.5–15.6 (2018), https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/lc/PDFs/draftingmanual.pdf
(“Uniform Acts . . . are probably best left alone in order to ensure the sought-after uniformity. Do not make
substantive changes to Uniform Acts unless the changes are clearly requested by the draft or amendment
requester.”).
109
ME. OFF. OF THE REVISOR OF STATUTES, MAINE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL 156 (2016),
https://legislature.maine.gov/doc/1353; see also, e.g., COLO. OFF. OF LEGIS. LEGAL SERVS., COLORADO LEGISLATIVE
DRAFTING MANUAL 12-1 (2021), https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/drafting-manual-20211029.pdf
(“[U]niform acts are usually written in ways that are inconsistent with [Colorado Revised Statutes] format and
the procedures and practices [of the state’s Office of Legislative Legal Services], and questions often arise about
when it is appropriate to change something in a uniform act.”); S.D. LEGIS. RSCH. COUNCIL, GUIDE TO
LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 3 (2021), https://sdlegislature.gov/docs/referencematerials/draftingmanual.pdf (“The
drafting of a uniform act may require a great deal of additional work on the part of the drafter to remove
contradictory existing provisions that may already exist in state law, as well as minor style and format changes.”).
110
See, e.g., ULC, Drafting Rules, supra note 88, at 38 (discussing legislative notes); see also, e.g., ILL.
LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, ILLINOIS BILL DRAFTING MANUAL 171 (2012), https://www.ilga.gov/commission/
lrb/manual.pdf (“A Uniform Act may also contain a ‘legislative note’ advising that certain language in the
Uniform Act should be omitted or modified under certain circumstances.”). By way of illustration, Section 2 of
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Sometimes, however, legislatures make substantive changes designed to
alter—or negate—how the ULC intended the provision to work. For example,
multiple states have altered a controversial pair of Uniform Probate Code (UPC)
and UTC provisions that were meant to reverse background common law,
thereby preserving the common law by statute.111 These modifications reversed
the effect of the Uniform Act versions of those provisions.
Crucially, state legislatures typically retain the ULC’s standard promoteuniformity clause when enacting a Uniform Act. For example, all fifty states,
plus the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands, have enacted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act—and
all the enactments include the directive that the act must be interpreted in light
of “the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter
among states that enact it.”112 Likewise, of the fifty-two states and territories that
have enacted the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA)—excluding
Illinois, but including D.C., Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands—all have
incorporated the UETA’s promote-uniformity provision.113
Some states even have an omnibus promote-uniformity command that
applies to all state-enacted Uniform Acts. For example, Texas’s provides that
“[a] uniform act included in a code shall be construed to effect its general

the Uniform Directed Trust Act contains a legislative note, separate from the comments, providing instructions
to states about how to incorporate the blackletter text depending on which portions of the Uniform Trust Act
they have decided to adopt. See UNIF. DIRECTED TR. ACT § 2 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (“Legislative Note: A
state that has enacted Uniform Trust Code (Last Revised or Amended in 2010) Section 103(18), defining ‘terms
of a trust,’ or Uniform Trust Decanting Act (2015) Section 2(28), defining ‘terms of the trust,’ should update
those definitions to conform to paragraph (8). A state that has enacted Uniform Trust Code Section 103(15) and
(20) could replace paragraphs (6) and (10) of this section with cross-references to those provisions. A state that
has not enacted Uniform Trust Code Section 111 should replace the bracketed language of paragraph (8)(B)(iii)
with a cross reference to the state’s statute governing nonjudicial settlement or should omit paragraph (8)(B)(iii)
if the state does not have such a statute.”) (emphasis omitted).
111
See ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 370, 738–39 (11th ed.
2022) (discussing UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603(b)(3) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1990) and UNIF. TR. CODE § 411(c)
(UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010)).
112
See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAM. SUPPORT ACT § 901 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2008). For states adopting section
901 verbatim, see, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 22/901 (2019); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518C.901 (2019); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 546-B (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-14-901 (2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.901 (2014);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.21A.905 (2016).
113
See supra note 105 (listing jurisdictions enacting the UETA); see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-32106(c) (2020) (“This chapter must be construed and applied . . . to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform
the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among States enacting it.”); FLA. STAT. ANN .§ 668.50(6)(c)
(2021) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 26-2-8-105(3) (2015) (same); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 9406(3) (2009)
(same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325L.06(3) (2022) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A-12-6(c) (2004) (same); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 15-106(3) (2015) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-10-106(3) (2021) (same); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 46-4-106(3) (2014) (same).
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purpose to make uniform the law of those states that enact it.”114 Hawaii, Illinois,
Minnesota, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wyoming all have
similar rules; Hawaii’s applies even to stand alone “provisions of uniform acts
adopted by the State.”115
Reflecting the tight connection between the blackletter text and the official
comments, some state legislatures also have a standing instruction that the
comments must be printed in the official statutory reporter along with the text of
an enacted Uniform Act. For example, North Carolina’s enacted version of
Article 9 of the UCC directs the state’s Revisor of Statutes to “cause to be printed
as annotations to the published General Statutes, all relevant portions of the
Official Comments to the 2010 Amendments to Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code”116 In Colorado, the Office of Legislative Legal Services
“publish[es] the URL to the ULC’s website where the official ULC comments

114
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.028 (2015); Equistar Chems., LP v. ClydeUnion DB, Ltd., 579 S.W.3d
505, 517 (Tex. App. 2019) (“When reviewing a uniform act such as the UCC, we must construe the act to effect
its general purpose and to make uniform the law of those states that enact it.”).
115
See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-24 (2008) (providing that statutory provisions taken from Uniform Acts
“shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate their general purpose to make uniform the laws of the
states and territories which enact them”); In re Marriage of Gulla & Kanaval, 917 N.E.2d 392, 399 (Ill. 2009)
(noting that the Illinois Supreme Court has “long recognized that in construing uniform legislation, a court must
interpret the statutory language so as to give effect to the beneficent legislative purpose of promoting harmony
in the law”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 645.22 (1950) (“Laws uniform with those of other states shall be interpreted
and construed to effect their general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact them.”); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 1-02-13 (2008) (“Any provision in this code which is a part of a uniform statute must be so
construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.”); 1 PA.
CONSOL. STAT. ANN. § 1927 (2008) (providing that “[s]tatutes uniform with those of other states shall be
interpreted and construed to effect their general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact
them”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-14-13 (2019) (“Whenever a statute appears in the code of laws enacted by § 216-13 which, from its title, text, or source note, appears to be a uniform law, it shall be so interpreted and
construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.”); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 8-1-103(a)(vii) (2007) (“Any uniform act shall be interpreted and construed to effectuate its
general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.”); see also Swaps, LLC v. ASL
Properties, Inc., 791 S.E.2d 711, 713 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (“As with other uniform laws, the Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act ‘shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the law of those states which enact it.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1–266) (2011));
Minnesota ex rel. Monroe v. Monroe, No. 17042, 1995 WL 411393, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 5, 1995) (“As
a uniform act, URESA is to be ‘interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact it.’”) (citation omitted). While beyond the scope of this Article,
a potential empirical extension would be to examine whether courts in states with these omnibus promoteuniformity provisions are more likely to identify a state statute as originating with the ULC and to give effect to
the accompanying comments.
116
H.R. 1068, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011).
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appear in a cross reference after each [corresponding] section” of a Uniform Act
as enacted in that state.117
II. TEXTUALISM: THEORY AND ASSUMPTIONS
To frame our adaptation of textualism for the unique content and two-step
political economy of a state statute that originates as a Uniform Act, we review
contemporary textualism’s foundational principles, nevertheless mindful of the
internal diversity of this mature interpretive approach.118 These principles can
be distilled into three propositions. First, the text is the law, although allowance
is made for textual context. Second, no identifiable legislative intent or purpose
may be discerned by aggregating the preferences of individual legislators. Third,
judges should avoid discretionary policy judgments when interpreting statutory
texts.119
A. The Text Is the Law
Textualism’s defining commitment is the proposition that “only the words
on the page constitute the law.”120 In Justice Antonin Scalia’s formulation, the
“supremacy-of-text principle” provides that “the words of a governing text are
of paramount concern, and what they convey . . . is what the text means.”121
Grounded in the view that “[w]ords . . . have a limited range of meaning,”
textualism discourages adopting an “interpretation [of a statute] that goes
beyond that range.”122 Textualists demand that courts “enforce the conventional

117
COLO. OFF. OF LEGIS. LEGAL SERVS., supra note 109, at 12-6 (“Until 2017, the practice of the CCUSL
and the Office was that, if a uniform law bill became law, the Office would publish official comments to the
uniform law as prepared by the ULC, but only if the bill included either a statutory or nonstatutory requirement
for the revisor of statutes to do so.”). In South Carolina, comments are included with the enrolled bill enacting a
Uniform Act. See, e.g., S.B. 422, 116th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2005) (describing the role of Comments
in the South Carolina Trust Code).
118
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
119
See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2193, 2199
(2017) [hereinafter Barrett, Congressional Insiders] (arguing that textualists emphasize “text, legislative
supremacy, and faithful agency”).
120
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020); see also, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 60 (1988) [hereinafter
Easterbrook, Original Intent] (arguing that it is the “words of the statute, and not the intent of the drafters” that
count as “the ‘law’”); Siegel, supra note 12, at 131 (arguing that textualism’s “prime directive” is that “the text
of a statute is the law”).
121
SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 18, at 56; see also, e.g., Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S.
429, 459–60 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in principal part and concurring in the judgment) (“Because we are a
government of laws, not of men, and are governed by what Congress enacted rather than by what it intended,
the sole object of the interpretive enterprise is to determine what a lay says.”).
122
SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 24.

ELINSONSITKOFF_6.15.22

1098

6/21/2022 11:08 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1073

meaning of a clear text, even if it does not appear to make perfect sense of the
statute’s overall policy.”123 Thus, when contemporary textualists analyze the
“meaning” of the statutory text, they seek to recover its original public
meaning—that is, the meaning that “comes from the ring the words [of the
statute] would have had to a skilled user of words at the time, thinking about the
same problem.”124
This rigorous formalism is grounded on the claim that “the text, and only the
text” is constitutionally legitimate.125 Textualists emphasize the primacy of the
“statutory text alone” because only that text—unlike any “unenacted legislative
intentions or purposes”—has “survived the constitutionally prescribed process
of bicameralism and presentment.”126 Giving effect to extratextual materials
risks “bypass[ing]” this “gauntlet” and so violates the process for making law
the Constitution prescribes.127 As Justice Neil Gorsuch recently put it in Bostock,
“[i]f judges could add to, remodel, update, or detract from old statutory terms
inspired only by extratextual sources and our own imaginations, we would risk
amending statutes outside the legislative process reserved for the people’s
representatives.”128
To be sure, textualists acknowledge that other materials may be necessary to
understand the broader context in which the text is embedded.129 “Words,”
Scalia observed, “are given meaning by their context.”130 Interpreters must
therefore read a word or phrase against the backdrop of “specialized conventions
123
John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001) [hereinafter
Manning, Equity of the Statute].
124
Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 120, at 61; see also Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 (“This Court
normally interprets a statute in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its
enactment.”); id. at 1766 (Alito, J., dissenting) (characterizing the textualist inquiry as one that seeks to answer
how the “terms of a statute [would] have been understood by ordinary people at the time of enactment”); Hively
v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 361 (7th Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“Statutory
interpretation is an objective inquiry that looks for the meaning the statutory language conveyed to a reasonable
person at the time of enactment.”); SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 18, at 78 (“Words must be
given the meaning they had when the text was adopted.”).
125
FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 34 (2009).
126
Manning, What Divides, supra note 23, at 73.
127
Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.).
128
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
129
Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 123, at 71.
130
SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 18, at 56; see also Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1767 (Alito,
J., dissenting) (“[W]hen textualism is properly understood, it calls for an examination of the social context in
which a statute was enacted because this may have an important bearing on what its words were understood to
mean at the time of enactment.”); Manning, What Divides, supra note 23, at 81 (noting that “modern textualism
necessarily—and quite properly—draws upon contextual cues”); Grove, supra note 16, at 279 (“Modern
textualists have, for example, long insisted that the method is not literalism. Instead, one can understand language
only in context.”).
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and linguistic practices peculiar to the law,” including “the often elaborate (but
textually unspecified) connotations of a technical term of art.”131
Nevertheless, textualists largely eschew reliance on extratextual statements
of purpose—committee reports, for instance, or floor statements.132 This
skepticism is motivated by two principal concerns. One is conceptual. As Justice
Amy Coney Barrett notes, “[t]extualists have long objected to the use of
legislative history on the ground that it is designed to uncover a nonexistent, and
in any event irrelevant, legislative intent.”133 The other is constitutional. At least
when it comes to the federal lawmaking process, treating Congress’s
extratextual statements of purpose as authoritative guides to the statute’s
meaning “is tantamount to lawmaking by Congressional subgroups” and thus
forbidden under INS v. Chadha and Bowsher v. Synar.134 In this sense, textualists
seek to respect “Congress’s own procedural choice[]” to bring only the “dull,
technical, formal final text” to a floor vote, rather than the “other texts that
[Congress] generates . . . but chooses not to bring before the body as a whole.”135
B. The Fiction of Legislative Purpose
Textualists argue that bringing together a winning coalition within a
legislature demands too many tradeoffs to generate a traceable, nontextual logic.
On this account, assembling a legislative majority requires a series of
“awkward” drafting compromises that “attempt to split the difference between
competing principles.”136 These compromises ultimately assure passage. As

131
Manning, What Divides, supra note 23, at 81; John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 2387, 2457 (2003) [hereinafter Manning, Absurdity Doctrine] (“[T]extualists do believe that statutes
convey meaning only because members of a relevant linguistic community apply shared background
conventions for understanding how particular words are used in particular contexts.”).
132
This is, admittedly, an over-simplification. Scalia, for example, acknowledged that legislative history
could be used “for the same purpose as one might use a dictionary or a treatise,” SCALIA & GARNER, READING
LAW, supra note 18, at 382, and Manning has suggested that “legislative history may be informative or
persuasive,” particularly in prompting “a judge to investigate whether a seemingly ordinary term or phrase, in
fact, has specialized meaning in legal parlance,” John F. Manning, Why Does Congress Vote on Some Texts but
Not Others?, 51 TULSA L. REV. 559, 570–71 (2016) [hereinafter Manning, Why Does Congress Vote].
Nevertheless, the broader point holds that textualists disclaim the use of these materials as guides to the statute’s
meaning.
133
Barrett, Congressional Insiders, supra note 119, at 2205.
134
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 671 (1990) [hereinafter
Eskridge, New Textualism]; John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673,
706, 717 (1997) [hereinafter Manning, Nondelegation Doctrine].
135
John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1947 (2015) [hereinafter
Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind]; John F. Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 2397, 2427 (2017) [hereinafter Manning, Without the Pretense].
136
Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 131, at 2411.
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Judge Frank Easterbrook explains, “[l]egislation is compromise. Compromises
have no spirit; they just are.”137 The explicit point of reference is a statute that
Congress drafts and then enacts. In this model, “[b]ills take their final shape” in
Congress, even if that may involve “multiple committees, behind-the-scenes
logrolling, the threat of a Senate filibuster or presidential veto, the need to fight
for scarce floor time, the need for unanimous consent to expedite votes in the
Senate, and countless other factors.”138
Textualists draw an important distinction between the legislature as a
collective and the individual lawmakers that compose it. According to Scalia,
“collective intent is pure fiction because dozens if not hundreds of legislators
have their own subjective views on the minutiae of bills they are voting on—or
perhaps no views at all because they are wholly unaware of the minutiae.”139
The consequence is that the content of a given statute results as much from
arbitrary or idiosyncratic procedural sequencing, including how leaders choose
to set the legislative agenda, as it does from the policy views of its members.140
In William Eskridge’s formulation, “[t]he statutes that result from th[e] process
of sequential deals and trade-offs tend to be filled with complex compromises
which cannot easily be distilled into one overriding public purpose.”141
It follows that courts must give up on the fiction that as outside observers
they can identify the goal that animates a legislative majority by analyzing the
stated preferences of individual legislators.142 There is nothing behind the text;
it reflects the “delicate compromise between legislative objectives; attempts to
extrapolate the ‘spirit’ of a law may upset this balance.”143 And courts can best
enforce the actual bargain the legislature struck by giving primacy to the
statute’s text. The words themselves—the “semantic detail[s]” of legislation—
137
Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Statutory Interpretation].
138
Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, supra note 135, at 1919.
139
SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 18, at 392; see also Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra
note 131, at 2412 (arguing that the preferences of the legislature as a whole “cannot realistically be aggregated
into a coherent collective decision”); Manning, Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 134, at 685 (similar).
140
Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 131, at 2113, 2412 (“The procedures for considering
legislation . . . play a crucial role in determining its content.”).
141
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 27 (1994).
142
Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 112 (2010)
[hereinafter Barrett, Substantive Canons] (“The defining tenet of textualism is the belief that it is impossible to
know whether Congress would have drafted the statute differently if it had anticipated the situation before the
court.”).
143
CROSS, supra note 125, at 32; see also E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57,
68–69 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The final form of a statute or regulation, especially in
the regulated fields where the public policy doctrine is likely to rear its head, is often the result of compromise
among various interest groups, resulting in a decision to go so far and no farther.”).
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are “the only effective means that legislators possess to specify the limits of an
agreed-upon legislative bargain.”144
C. The Proper Role of Courts
For textualists, courts have a necessarily limited role to play under the
Constitution. By and large, they view courts as the faithful agents of legislative
principals.145 “[I]n our system of government,” John Manning explains, “federal
judges have a duty to ascertain and implement as accurately as possible the
instructions set down by Congress (within constitutional bounds).”146 Rooted in
a robust conception of the separation of powers, textualism insists that
lawmaking is the province of the democratically elected legislature. Assuring
lawmakers that the “lines of inclusion and exclusion” they draw will be enforced
in court,147 textualism guarantees that the “function of the popular branches” is
not “diminished.”148 Put differently, looking past the words of a statute risks
“render[ing] democratically adopted texts mere springboards for judicial
lawmaking.”149
Textualism is therefore meant to discipline judges. Dissenting in Bostock,
Justice Brett Kavanaugh reflected that “[i]f judges could rewrite laws based on
their own policy views, . . . the critical distinction between legislative authority
and judicial authority that undergirds the Constitution’s separation of powers
would collapse.”150 The hypothesized alternative to textualism—a free-floating

144
Manning, What Divides, supra note 23, at 92; Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 131, at 2410
(“The legislative process . . . is too complex, too path-dependent, and too opaque to allow judges to reconstruct
whether Congress would have resolved any particular question differently from the way the clear statutory text
resolves that question.”).
145
See, e.g., Barrett, Congressional Insiders, supra note 119, at 2208 (“Textualists have routinely
described courts as the faithful agents of Congress.”); Barrett, Substantive Canons, supra note 142, at 110
(“[T]extualists . . . understand courts to be the faithful agents of Congress.”). For Scalia, however, courts are not
“agents of the legislature,” but instead “agents of the people, charged with remedying the harm that a person
claims to have suffered at the hands of another person or of the government.” SCALIA & GARNER, READING
LAW, supra note 18, at 138–39. The bottom line remains the same, however. In their capacity as agents of a
popular principal, “[i]t is no part of [the judicial] charge to write laws that the legislature has not written.” Id.
146
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 430 (2005) [hereinafter
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent]; Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 123, at 61 (“[T]he sharp
separation of legislative and judicial powers was designed, in large measure, to limit judicial discretion—and
thus to promote governance according to known and established laws.”).
147
Manning, Without the Pretense, supra note 135, at 2424.
148
SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 18, at 83.
149
SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 25; see also id. at 17 (“[I]t is simply
incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law
determined by what the lawgiver meant rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated.”).
150
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1824 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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inquiry into Congress’s objectives—is thought to unduly “liberate[]” courts.151
As Eskridge observes, “consideration of legislative history creates greater
opportunities for the exercise of judicial discretion. . . . A focus on the text alone,
it is argued, is a more concrete inquiry which will better constrain the tendency
of judges to substitute their will for that of Congress.”152
In this vein, textualists also argue that excluding legislative history improves
predictability. For example, Kavanaugh has suggested that when “courts . . . seek
the best reading of the statute by interpreting the words of the statute,” the result
is that “each [judicial] umpire is operating within the same guidelines,” and so
“we will need to worry less about who the umpire is when the next pitch is
thrown.”153 Working from the same closed and discrete set of materials better
ensures that any jurist confronted with the same issue will reach the same result.
III. AN INTERPRETIVE CANON: APPLYING TEXTUALISM TO UNIFORM ACTS
Having canvassed the political economy of Uniform Acts and the
foundational assumptions of textualism, we are now able to apply textualist
theory to the unique content and two-step political economy of a state-enacted
Uniform Act. We develop an interpretive canon appropriate to this distinctive
species of positive law. Put most provocatively, we contend that textualist
principles obligate courts to treat the official comments—which textualists
would otherwise dismiss as non-authoritative legislative history—as persuasive
guides to the statute’s meaning.
In developing our interpretive canon, we begin with the simplest case. The
text of a Uniform Act enacted in its entirety, including the ULC’s promoteuniformity clause, directs courts to look to the official comments accompanying
the blackletter text for interpretive guidance. We then complicate the story,
examining the enactment of provisions from a Uniform Act but without the
promote-uniformity command. Such an enactment, we argue, signals to
reviewing courts to treat the Act’s official comments as persuasive authority.
The strength of that signal, however, depends on how much of the Uniform Act’s
statutory text the legislature adopts. The more text it enacts wholesale, the
stronger the signal; the less, the weaker.

151

Easterbrook, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 137, at 63.
Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 134, at 674; see also KATZMANN, supra note 12, at 41 (“[C]ritics
of legislative history argue that its use impermissibly increases the discretion of judges to roam through the wide
range of often inconsistent materials and rely on those that suit their position.”).
153
Brett Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2121 (2016) (emphasis
omitted).
152
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With this conceptual architecture in place, we illustrate the practical payoffs
of our proposed interpretive canon for state-enacted Uniform Acts by reference
to three cases interpreting the UPC and UTC. We defer until Part IV further
puzzles and complications, such as if a state modifies the text of a Uniform Act
or otherwise enacts a hybrid or blended statute.
A. Directives: Implementing the Promote-Uniformity Clause
We begin with the simplest case: enactment by a state legislature of the
entirety of a Uniform Act without modification. Such an enactment would
include the ULC’s promote-uniformity clause: the command that courts must
give “consideration . . . to the need to promote uniformity of the law” in
construing Uniform Acts.154 For textualists, this command, embedded directly
in “the very words” of the statute, must be given effect.155 It is, as one state
supreme court explained, a “legislative directive that the [Act] be construed to
make uniform the law among the jurisdictions enacting it.”156
Implementing this directive requires courts to use the comments in the way
the ULC meant them to be used—as persuasive sources of authority about the
text’s meaning.157 As we have seen, the ULC drafts the blackletter text with the
expectation that interpreters will use the comments to inform their construction
of that text. Indeed, the ULC’s Committee Procedure Manual provides that it is
“[t]he final copy of an approved act, with comments” that is submitted to state
legislatures for enactment.158 Because the comments accompanying a Uniform
Act are, by design, an integral part of the statutory package, a legislature does
not adopt the blackletter text in isolation from the supporting official
comments.159
To be sure, legislatures only rarely instruct courts specifically to treat the
comments as authoritative.160 But the meaning we are attributing to the text of
154

See supra notes 90 & 91 and accompanying text.
SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 18, at 56.
156
Mortg. Specialists, Inc. v. Davey, 904 A.2d 652, 664 (N.H. 2006).
157
See ULC, Committee Procedure Manual, supra note 64, at 9 (“Comments are not to be used as a
substitute for or to modify a substantive provision in an act. The statutory text always governs any conflict or
inconsistency between the text and the comments.”).
158
See id. (emphasis added).
159
See In re Trust of Shire, 907 N.W.2d 263, 268 (Neb. 2018) (“[W]hen the Legislature provides a direct
reference to a section of a uniform law code when adopting that code, it incorporates the comments explaining
that section.”).
160
Kentucky’s enacted version of the Uniform Commercial Code, for instance, provides, “Official
comments to the Uniform Commercial Code . . . represent the express legislative intent of the General Assembly
155
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the promote-uniformity command is in accord with textualist commitments.
Recall that contemporary textualists embrace reliance on text in context.161 In so
doing, textualists recognize that courts should “give effect to terms of art—
phrases that acquire specialized meaning through use over time as the shared
language of specialized communities.”162 So, too, they may “draw upon settled
background conventions of the legal system.”163 Adopting the ULC’s promoteuniformity command does just this kind of work. It is a form of legal shorthand:
a way for the enacting legislature to direct courts—via the text itself—to give
effect to the accompanying explanatory packaging with the aim of ensuring that
the text is interpreted in a manner consistent with the meaning the ULC ascribed
to the text.164
The key is that courts will be more likely to achieve substantive uniformity,
as commanded by the text of the promote-uniformity clause, if they treat the
comments as persuasive authority. Comments provide important explanation
and background about how a particular provision is supposed to work,165
sometimes even describing rejected alternatives.166 Aided by the ULC’s official
and shall be used as a guide for interpretation of this chapter, except that if the text and the official comments
conflict, the text shall control.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.1-103(3) (2006). Pennsylvania is unique (as far as
we know) among states in specifying by statute that it is permissible to consider comments, but only if the
materials were available to the enacting legislature. See 1 PA. STAT. AND CONSOL. STAT. ANN. § 1939 (1972)
(“The comments or report of the commission, committee, association or other entity which drafted a statute may
be consulted in the construction or application of the original provisions of the statute if such comments or report
were published or otherwise generally available prior to the consideration of the statute by the General Assembly,
but the text of the statute shall control in the event of conflict between its text and such comments or report.”);
Trust Under Agreement of Taylor, 164 A.3d 1147, 1160 (Pa. 2017) (“The heading for section 7740.1 contains a
reference to the corresponding UTC section number (UTC 411), and we may thus consider the UTC’s Uniform
Law Comment as evidence of the General Assembly’s intent with respect to the proper application and scope of
section 7740.1.”); Lessner v. Rubinson, 592 A.2d 678, 680 n.4 (Pa. 1991) (“Official comments are to be given
weight in the construction of statutes.”).
161
See supra note 130 (discussing textualists’ recognition of context).
162
Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 123, at 112; see also SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW,
supra note 18, at 73 (“Sometimes context indicates that a technical meaning applies. . . . Where the text is
addressing a scientific or technical subject, a specialized meaning is to be expected[,] . . . which often differs
from common meaning.”).
163
Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 123, at 113.
164
Cf. Manning, Non-Delegation Doctrine, supra note 134, at 730 (“Just as the Sentencing Commission
itself adopts both the Sentencing Guidelines and the official commentary accompanying them, Congress itself
(as opposed to its agents) could more routinely enact official commentary that authoritatively explains the
primary statutory text.”).
165
See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019) (“By way of dispensing power, this
new section allows the probate court to excuse a harmless error in complying with the formal requirements for
executing or revoking a will.”).
166
See, e.g., UNIF. TR. CODE § 105 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (“During the drafting of the Uniform
Trust Code, the drafting committee discussed and rejected a proposal that the ability of the settlor to waive
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comments, courts in different states are more likely to reach the same answer to
an interpretive question and to be confident they have done so for the right
reasons. By analogy, courts routinely (and without controversy) implement the
directive to promote uniformity in another way: by treating other jurisdictions’
judicial interpretations of the same Uniform Act provision as persuasive guides
to the meaning of their own state’s enacted version.167
What matters here is that the directive to promote uniformity is found in the
statutory text. Looking to the comments best guarantees that courts will
implement that textual directive.168 The Connecticut Supreme Court has
explained:
Only if the intent of the drafters of a uniform act becomes the intent of
the legislature in adopting it can uniformity be achieved. Otherwise,
there would be as many variations of a uniform act as there are
legislatures that adopt it. Such a situation would completely thwart the
purpose of uniform laws.169

required notice be based on the nature of the beneficiaries’ interest and not on the beneficiaries’ age.”); id. § 505
cmt. (“Consequently, the drafters rejected the approach taken in States like Alaska and Delaware, both of which
allow a settlor to retain a beneficial interest immune from creditor claims.”); id. § 705 cmt. (“This section rejects
the common law rule that a trustee may resign only with permission of the court, and goes further than the
Restatements, which allow a trustee to resign with the consent of the beneficiaries.”).
167
See, e.g., Savage v. Zelent, 777 S.E.2d 801, 806 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (“Finally, for the sake of
uniformity of interpretation, the legislature endorses examination of cases from other jurisdictions in interpreting
the North Carolina Recognition Act.”) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1C-1859 (2015), the state’s version of the
ULC’s promote-uniformity clause); Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab’y, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714,
725 (Cal. App. Ct. 2014) (“In 1984, the Legislature ‘adopted without significant change’ the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (UTSA). Nearly all states have adopted the UTSA; although there are some variations, case law
applying UTSA enactments in other states is generally relevant in applying California’s UTSA.”) (citations
omitted); In re Schneider, 268 P.3d 215, 223 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) (“Because this is a matter of first impression
in Washington of interpreting a uniform law adopted by all 50 states, we may consider how these other states
have addressed the issue.”); Sternlicht v. Sternlicht, 876 A.2d 904, 911 n.3 (Pa. 2005) (“[I]n construing a uniform
law, this Court must consider the decisions of our sister states who have adopted and interpreted such uniform
law and must afford these decisions great deference.”).
168
This contention has particular force in those states where the comments are “included with the printing
of the statute.” Miller v. First Bank, 696 S.E.2d 824, 827–28 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that although the
official comment to the statute was “not enacted into law,” it was nevertheless “relevant in construing the intent
of the statute”); Conleys Creek Ltd. P’ship v. Smoky Mountain Country Club Prop. Owners Ass’n, 805 S.E.2d
147, 151 n.6 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (similar).
169
Yale Univ. v. Blumenthal, 621 A.2d 1304, 1307 (Conn. 1993) (citations omitted).
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As this case illustrates, some courts have recognized the informational value of
the official comments.170 But lacking a grounding in the conceptual foundations
of textualism, they have done so in a halting, ad hoc manner.171
The second, public choice-based, rationale undergirding textualism
strengthens the point. Ordinarily, textualists tell us, courts cannot discern a
statutory purpose because many “statutes are little else but backroom deals.”172
Indeed, “the complex compromises endemic in the political process suggest that
legislation is frequently a congeries of different and sometimes conflicting
purposes.”173 When it comes to a state-enacted Uniform Act, however, we do
not need to know “how most legislators ‘would have voted’ on issues they never
actually considered”174 or fear they would not have endorsed a purpose a court
later ascribed. Rather, we need know only that the legislature enacted a Uniform
Act, adopting the ULC’s blackletter text, including the promote-uniformity
clause, against the backdrop of the official commentary to that text.175
One way to frame this point is by analogy to the so-called borrowed statute
rule, an interpretive canon providing that a legislature that enacts another state’s
statute verbatim also imports that state’s courts’ interpretations of the statute.176
Textualists have expressed skepticism about the merits of the rule on the ground
that the “competent lawyer” cannot know “that a statute has been ‘copied’ from

170
See, e.g., In re Trust of Shire, 907 N.W.2d 263, 272 (Neb. 2018) (“[W]e must construe a statute in pari
materia with other sections of the same act and in light of UTC comments when the Legislature has incorporated
them.”); In re Bradley K. Brakke Trust, 890 N.W.2d 549, 554 (N.D. 2017) (“When we interpret and apply
provisions in a uniform law, we may look to official editorial board comments for guidance.”); Gerber & Gerber,
P.C. v. Regions Bank, 596 S.E.2d 174, 177 n.1 (Ga. App. Ct. 2004) (similar); Universal Motors, Inc. v. Neary,
984 P.2d 515, 517 (Alaska 1999) (similar).
171
See, e.g., infra Part III.C (discussing the practical interpretive pitfalls of failing to consider the
comments).
172
William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
STAN. L. REV. 321, 335 (1990).
173
Id.; see also Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 146, at 450 (describing the
legislative process as “complex and path dependent”); Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 131, at 2415
(observing that “idiosyncrasies of the process may sometimes shape the content of legislation”).
174
Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 134, at 643; see also SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra
note 18, at 376 (calling the notion that the legislature necessarily had a view on the matter at issue before the
court “pure fantasy” and commenting that “most legislatures could not possibly have focused on the narrow
point before the court” while “[t]he few who did undoubtedly had varying views”).
175
See Nelson, supra note 12, at 348 (“[J]udges whom we think of as textualists construct their sense of
objective meaning from what the evidence that they are willing to consider tells them about the subjective intent
of the enacting legislature.”).
176
CONG. RSCH. SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THEORIES, TOOLS, AND TRENDS 61 n.615 (2018),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45153 (defining the borrowed statute rule).
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that of another state.”177 But that concern is absent in the case of a Uniform Act
enacted wholesale because the text’s provenance is apparent on its face. Thus,
as the New Hampshire Supreme Court has reasoned, “[w]hen interpreting a
uniform law . . . ‘the intention of the drafters of a uniform act becomes the
legislative intent upon enactment.’”178
Treating the comments as persuasive interpretive aids also enables courts to
play their assigned role in the separation of powers framework. Looking to the
comments is the mechanism that the ULC has established for resolving difficult
interpretive problems. And when a legislature adopts the ULC’s text, including
the promote-uniformity command, the related principles of legislative
supremacy and faithful agency strongly suggest that courts should make use of
the official comments when interpreting the text. Taken together, the text and
the comments comprise a holistic legislative scheme. By using the comments to
interpret the blackletter text, courts best implement the legislature’s directive to
promote uniformity.
Increased interpretive predictability is a related payoff. To return to Justice
Kavanaugh’s metaphor, treating the official comments as persuasive authority
reduces the likelihood that different umpires will set different strike zones. By
looking to the statutory package in its entirety, including the comments, courts
work from a rich, but nevertheless closed, set of materials. On this view, the
comments provide a shared frame of reference for courts interpreting the same
Uniform Act’s text, ensuring that they are fluent in the same technical language.
Making use of a common corpus in this way facilitates uniformity across
different jurisdictions in accordance with the text’s directive to promote
uniformity.

177
SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 18, at 326. Some scholars have suggested that this
concern is overstated, insofar as it is not uncommon for states to borrow other states’ laws with the express
purpose of adopting their judicial interpretations. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware
Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1067 (2000); Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 488
(1987). But see Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 132 n.81
(2008) (arguing that these accounts exaggerate the extent of borrowing).
178
Hodges v. Johnson, 177 A.3d 86, 93 (N.H. 2017) (citations omitted); see also Yale Univ. v.
Blumenthal, 621 A.2d 1304, 1307 (Conn. 1993) (“[I]t is manifest that the legislature in enacting [the Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act (‘UMIFA’)] intended to implement the intention, meaning and
objectives of the commission that drafted UMIFA.”); In re Butler, 552 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Minn. 1996) (“The
intention of the drafters of a uniform act becomes the legislative intent upon enactment.”).
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B. Signals: Recovering Original Public Meaning
Now suppose that a state legislature enacts some portion of a Uniform Act
verbatim but not the full act with the promote-uniformity clause. In such a case,
the legislature has indicated through formal, constitutionally prescribed means
that it prefers the ULC’s language to an alternative text. This preference,
expressed through the legislature’s adoption of the Uniform Act’s provisions,
signals to courts to construe those provisions in light of their accompanying
official comments. Consistent with the textualist principle that courts must
“assume that [a legislature] picks its words with care,”179 the signal arises from
the legislature’s choice to enact the ULC’s words rather than a different statutory
formulation.
Receiving the signal requires first that courts identify when statutory text
originates from a Uniform Act.180 Next, the strength of the signal depends on (a)
how much of the Uniform Act’s text the legislature enacts, and (b) how much
the legislature modifies that text. Thus, when a legislature adopts much of a
Uniform Act unmodified, the absence of a promote-uniformity instruction is not
as consequential as it may seem. But when the legislature adopts only a few
provisions from a Uniform Act, or substantially modifies the text of those
provisions it does adopt, the absence of the promote-uniformity command
becomes more significant.181 To see why, we consider both the logic and
consequences of state enactment.
1. The Logic of State Enactment
Why might a legislature choose to “buy” legislative language from the ULC
rather than “make” it themselves?182 Using a simple rational choice framework
in which legislators are motivated primarily by reelection and career

179
Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 80
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1613 (2012).
180
See, e.g., State v. Davison, 900 N.W.2d 66, 69 (N.D. 2017) (“The statute is adopted verbatim from
Section 7 of the Uniform Act on Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.”).
181
See infra Part IV.
182
See, e.g., Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 393–98 (1937) (arguing that
transaction costs may make it more efficient for a firm to produce goods or services in-house rather than contract
out for them). In 1991, Coase was awarded the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of
Alfred Nobel in part for this work. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
Nobel 1991, THE NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1991/summary/ (last
visited May 11, 2022). For a recent study assessing why state policymakers might choose to “invent” their own
policy rather than borrow it, see Srinivas C. Parinandi, Policy Inventing and Borrowing Among State
Legislatures, 64 AM. J. POL. SCI. 852 (2020).
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advancement, we propose three overlapping possibilities: uniformity, expertise,
and efficiency.
Adopting off-the-shelf text from a Uniform Act rather than bespoke
provisions allows legislators to benefit from the uniformity that the Uniform Act
is designed to achieve. Legislators can be reasonably assured that the subject
matter of any proposed Uniform Act is “consistent” with the ULC’s core
objective “to promote uniformity in the law.”183 As Ribstein and Kobayashi
highlight, uniformity can reduce the costs that would otherwise result from
differences in state laws, including inefficiencies stemming from “inconsistent
mandatory rules”; lack of information about applicable law; choice-of-law
issues and related “deadweight litigation costs” related to forum-shopping;
uncertainty about the likelihood of legal change; and externalities imposed on
out-of-state actors.184 As a result, lawmakers may choose to shepherd a Uniform
Act through the legislative process rather than draft a statute from scratch to
claim credit for helping to eliminate costly jurisdictional differences.185
Legislators may also support provisions from a Uniform Act to benefit from
the ULC’s expertise.186 As we have seen, the ULC’s drafting process brings
together subject-matter experts—from the chair and reporter to individual
commissioners, representatives of key interest groups, and leading practitioners.
The text that results from the ULC’s intensive, multi-year drafting process thus
reflects substantive vetting by the Commissioners themselves and by leading
subject-matter experts from across the country.187 When lawmakers rely on the
ULC’s handwork, claims that “their proposals are well-designed and
mainstream” are made more credible.188 As Katerina Linos argues, “referencing
[external] models . . . can help politicians signal . . . that a proposal has been

183

ULC, Statement of Policy, supra note 57 (citation omitted).
Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 72, at 138–39.
185
See MAYHEW, supra note 54, at 73 (“These, then, are the three kinds of electorally oriented activities
congressmen engage in—advertising, credit claiming, and position taking.”).
186
The ULC can thus perform a similar function to that played by congressional committees. For the
concept of “informational” committees, see, e.g., KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE
ORGANIZATION 76 (1992); Gerald Gamm & Kenneth Shepsle, Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing
Committees in the House and Senate, 1810-1825, 14 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 39, 59–60 (1989).
187
The ULC’s drafting process also takes notice of relevant social science evidence where it is available.
See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019) (“Empirical studies support the increase in
the surviving spouse’s intestate share, reflected in the revisions of this section.”); UNIF. PRUDENT INV. ACT pref
note (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1994) (noting the Act’s reliance on modern portfolio theory).
188
KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: HOW HEALTH, FAMILY,
AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES 13 (2013).
184

ELINSONSITKOFF_6.15.22

1110

6/21/2022 11:08 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1073

carefully vetted by disinterested outsiders and is not an ill-thought-out
experiment or a giveaway to fringe ideologues or special interest groups.”189
Finally, Uniform Acts also promote legislative efficiency.190 State
lawmakers, particularly those in less-professionalized legislatures, have limited
time and resources. Just as lobbyists subsidize legislators by “enlarg[ing] the
resources that [they] have to work on behalf of their constituents,”191 the ULC
can free lawmakers from having to spend their time crafting and vetting statutory
language. The details of the ULC’s drafting process, and the fact that ULC
commissioners are political appointees, can help to provide cover against
charges that, in relying on the ULC, legislators have abdicated their
responsibilities. And because key interest groups have an opportunity to provide
input into the content of the Uniform Act, legislators can rely on their continued
buy-in during the state-enactment process—so long as the ULC’s language is
largely kept intact. At minimum, lawmakers can feel secure that voting for
legislation that has already been through the ULC’s drafting process will not
expose them to unexpected backlash.
To be sure, state legislators frequently rely on extra-legislative actors (often
lobbyists) to draft legislation.192 To appease particular constituencies or interest
groups, they may even enact language these groups supply.193 While this
practice may superficially resemble legislators’ reliance on the ULC, there are
two critical differences.
First, unlike lobbying groups, the ULC is a governmental body authorized
by statute in each of the fifty states as well as several territories.194 It is funded
through state-level appropriations for precisely this purpose.195 And the ULC’s
commissioners are appointed by state governors or other elected officials.196 The
ULC is thus best understood as an auxiliary legislative body recognized by state

189

Id. at 13–14.
Cf. Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69,
72 (2006) (observing that no legislator “can engage in all of the activities needed to make maximum progress
toward all of the objectives that they and their constituents care about”).
191
Id. at 81.
192
Id. at 74 (explaining that one way lobbyists assist legislators is through their ability to analyze,
synthesize, and summarize issues, which, in turn, “enables [them] to make a greater effort on the issue”).
193
Id.
194
See supra Part I.B.
195
See supra Part I.B.
196
See supra Part I.B.
190
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law.197 In consequence, its output represents a legitimate source of positive law
in a way that interest group proposals do not.
Second, the work of the ULC is public, formal, and transparent.198 Meetings
of the ULC are open to all. Language drafted by the ULC must receive formal
approval within the drafting committee to be referred to the full body and then
must be promulgated in accordance with the ULC’s state-by-state voting
procedures.199 These procedures differ substantially from the more ad hoc (and
often secret) processes that characterize interest group drafting.
Taken together, these differences strengthen the inference that legislators are
deliberately drawing on the ULC’s unique juridical status and authority when
they enact Uniform Acts in whole or in part—that is, they are consciously
choosing to adopt the ULC’s promulgated statutory text with specific attention
to its origins. Reflecting this point, many state drafting manuals treat Uniform
Acts distinctively from other sources of legislation.200
2. The Consequences of State Enactment
A legislature’s enactment of the ULC’s statutory language instead of an
alternative text signals to courts that the accompanying comments should be
treated as persuasive interpretive guides. Begin with textualism’s primary
rationale: that courts must prioritize the statutory text because only the text has
passed through the constitutionally prescribed hurdles for making law.201 On our
account, the text itself is the source of the legislative signal.
The overwhelming inference, arising from the text itself, is that the
legislature enacted these words rather than other words owing to their
provenance and the accompanying shared, specialized conventions for such text.
By virtue of the legislature’s choice to enact the ULC’s text and not a competing
alternative, the statute’s meaning at the time of its enactment is whatever
meaning the ULC ascribed to it. It follows that courts can best identify the
enacted text’s original public meaning by making use of the interpretive tools
197
Langbein, supra note 38, at 3 (describing the ULC as “a legislative drafting consortium of the state
governments”).
198
See supra Part I.B.
199
See supra Part I.B.
200
See, e.g., ILL. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, supra note 110, at 171 (instructing drafters not to “use
‘Uniform’ as the first word in an Act’s short title or otherwise state that an Act may be cited as a Uniform Act
unless the Act is recommended by [the ULC]”); cf. ARIZ. LEG. COUNCIL, supra note 108, at 66 (“Unlike uniform
acts, model acts may originate from any number of sources and are prepared with varying degrees of skill and
quality.”).
201
See supra Part II.A.
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the ULC provides—namely, the official comments. As the Missouri Supreme
Court has said, “[w]hen ‘construing uniform and model acts enacted by the [state
legislature], we must assume it did so with the intention of adopting the
accompanying interpretations placed thereon by the drafters of the model or
uniform act.’”202
Put differently, the ULC’s text is what secured a winning coalition in each
chamber of the legislature and the signature of the state’s executive. Because the
ULC’s text is part of a package that is meant to be read in light of its official
comments, courts should view the legislature’s adoption of that text as a signal—
consistent with its technical context—to treat the accompanying comments as
persuasive guides to the text’s meaning.203 The official comments convey the
ULC’s understanding of the text’s meaning—and that meaning becomes the
text’s meaning upon the enactment of the ULC’s language. This insight provides
a conceptual foundation for the intuition sometimes (but not always) expressed
by courts that “[i]n the case of a statutory enactment patterned after a uniform
law drafted by the [Uniform Law Commission], a court may properly consider
the official comments . . . as a source for determining the meaning to be
attributed to an ambiguous provision.”204 Doing so accords respect to the
legislature as a collective lawmaking body that chooses its words carefully and
to account for the “term-of-art sense” in which the ULC’s words are used.205
To be sure, textualists ordinarily reject as a fiction the idea that a legislative
purpose can be identified by aggregating the preferences of individual
legislators. But the concern that the legislative process is too “delicate” to yield
a definable intent does not apply to these circumstances.206 No complex
guesswork is required in discerning the signal the legislature sent by enacting

202
In re Nocita, 914 S.W.2d 358, 359 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) (emphasis added) (quoting John Deere Co. v.
Jeff Dewitt Auction Co., 690 S.W.2d 511, 514 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)). The court explained that, in consequence,
the “comments accompanying a uniform code when adopted have great weight.” Id.; see also, e.g., May v. Ellis,
92 P.3d 859, 862 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc) (“When . . . ‘a statute is based on a uniform act, we assume that the
legislature intended to adopt the construction placed on the act by its drafters,’ and ‘[c]ommentary to such a
uniform act is highly persuasive.’”) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
203
As a general rule, this is precisely the use of legislative history that even sympathetic textualists reject.
See Manning, Why Does Congress Vote, supra note 132, at 571 (“The questions I have about Judge Katzmann’s
approach lie in the margin in which a judge credits legislative history not because of what it says but rather
because of who has generated it.”).
204
Griffin v. S.W. Devanney & Co., 775 P.2d 555, 559 (Colo. 1989) (citations omitted).
205
SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 18, at 76; see also Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct. 784,
788 (2018) (“[R]espect for Congress’s prerogatives as policymaker means carefully attending to the words it
chose rather than replacing them with others of our own.”); Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 131, at
2424 (discussing the presumption that “Congress . . . chose its words with care”).
206
CROSS, supra note 125, at 32.
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some portion of a Uniform Act verbatim. The best available inference is that it
intended to secure the benefits of the ULC’s product.207
This inference, which flows directly from the assumption that a legislature
chooses its words carefully, rests on a textual foundation, not a legislativehistorical one.208 The text reflects the legislature’s choice to forgo a customized
legislative solution in favor of a specific, prefabricated one. That sacrifice of
legislative autonomy is worthwhile only if the legislature can thereby secure the
benefits that flow from enacting a Uniform Act. These benefits, as discussed
above, include achieving uniformity across state lines; codifying other states’
best practices; capitalizing on the political networks and expertise of the ULC’s
commissioners, the Act’s reporter, and the interest groups that helped to shape
the Act; and the expediency of adopting non-bespoke legislation from an
authoritative source. Treating the comments as persuasive authority helps to
obtain each of these benefits, not only by ensuring that courts will interpret
Uniform Act provisions in a manner that reflects the ULC’s (and so an enacting
legislature’s) intended meaning, but also by ensuring substantively uniform
outcomes and reasoning across jurisdictions.
3. The Extent of State Enactment
The ULC does not present Uniform Acts on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Rather, a legislature may incorporate specific provisions of a Uniform Act or
even portions of individual provisions.209 The choice of how much of a Uniform
Act to enact thus has important interpretive consequences. For courts to play
their appropriate role in our separation of powers system, they must recognize
that the strength of the legislature’s signal is variable in a manner that affects the
persuasive weight of the comments.
As the Iowa Supreme Court has explained, “[w]e can determine legislative
intent from selective enactment or divergence from uniform acts.”210 The more
of the ULC’s promulgated language a legislature incorporates (even without the
promote-uniformity command), the more confident courts can be that the
legislature made a considered choice to adopt the integrated package of
blackletter text and comments, and the more interpretive traction the official
207
Patchel, supra note 73, at 139 (“After all, the whole idea behind the uniform laws process is for the
states all to enact the same law.”).
208
See Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 146, at 438 (“Textualists focus on the end
product of the legislative process . . . .”) (emphasis omitted).
209
See, e.g., Freedom Fin. Bank v. Estate of Boesen, 805 N.W.2d 802, 813–14 (Iowa 2011) (discussing
Iowa’s selective incorporation of provisions of the UPC).
210
Id. at 814 (citations omitted).
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comments provide. As another court put it, when a Uniform Act has “been
adopted all but verbatim by the legislature,” the comments serve “as the most
informed source explaining provisions of the original enactment.”211
By contrast, the more the legislature departs from the ULC’s text, the weaker
the inference that it deliberately enacted the Uniform Act as an integrated
package and the less interpretive traction the comments provide. The logic is
grounded, once again, on the textualist presumption that the legislature chooses
its words with care.212 “[W]hen the Legislature models a statute after a uniform
act, but does not adopt particular language, courts [must] conclude the omission
was deliberate.’”213 Assessing the signal’s strength thus entails a comparison of
the statutory provision as enacted with the version as promulgated by the
ULC.214 When confronted with a difference between a Uniform Act and the state
legislature’s enactment of that act, the question becomes whether the change is
“so substantial as to render the comment to the corresponding section of the
Uniform Act inapplicable.”215
To illustrate how this proposed canon might work in practice, consider the
following brief example. In a recent South Dakota case, the state’s supreme court
was asked to determine whether the state’s short statute of limitations governing
challenges to the validity of a revocable trust applied to claims for lack of
capacity or undue influence.216 The plaintiff argued that it applied only to claims
putting “document formalities” at issue; for questions involving capacity or
undue influence, the state’s more general and longer statute of limitations should
211
Holifield v. BancorpSouth, Inc., 891 So. 2d 241, 248 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004); see also ClearOne
Commc’ns v. Biamp Sys., 653 F.3d 1163, 1184–86 (10th Cir. 2011) (referring to the comments because the
relevant provision was “identical” to the Uniform Act).
212
See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
213
John A. Sheppard Mem’l Ecological Rsrv., Inc. v. Fanning, 836 S.E.2d 426, 431 (W. Va. 2019)
(quoting 2B NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 52:5) (first
alteration in original); Sallee v. Stewart, 827 N.W.2d 128, 142 (Iowa 2013) (same); see also Heirs of Ellis v.
Estate of Ellis, 71 S.W.3d 705, 713–14 (Tenn. 2002) (“When the legislature enacts provisions of a uniform or
model act without significant alteration, it may be generally presumed to have adopted the expressed intention
of the drafters of that uniform or model act. However, when the legislature makes significant departures from
the text of that uniform act, we must likewise presume that its departure was meant to express an intention
different from that manifested in the uniform act itself.”) (citation omitted); Hughes Elecs. Corp. v. Citibank
Delaware, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 244, 257 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (similar).
214
Legislative drafters can aid in this endeavor. Recognizing the state’s omnibus promote-uniformity
provision, Minnesota’s legislative drafting manual provides that “[b]ecause a uniform law is intended to be
interpreted and construed in a consistent manner among the states enacting it, it is useful to have some numbering
scheme or other matching system to coordinate provisions of the state act with their counterparts in the uniform
act on which they are based.” MINN. OFF. OF THE REVISOR OF STATUTES, MINNESOTA REVISOR’S MANUAL 10–
11 (2013), https://www.revisor.mn.gov/static/office/2013-Revisor-Manual.pdf.
215
Peter v. State, 531 P.2d 1263, 1268 (Alaska 1975).
216
In re Elizabeth A. Briggs Revocable Living Trust, 898 N.W.2d 465, 467 (S.D. 2017).
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apply.217 To answer the question, the court took notice that the legislature had
“copied” the short limitations provision for a challenge to the validity of a
revocable trust “nearly verbatim” from the corresponding provision in the
UTC.218 The court therefore looked to the official comment accompanying that
provision. Observing that the comment “uses claims of undue influence and lack
of capacity as specific examples of claims that are subject to [the provision’s]
time limits,” the court ruled against the plaintiff.219 The court, in other words,
received the signal the legislature sent by enacting a virtually unmodified
version of the ULC’s text and gave it effect by treating the comments as
persuasive guides to the statute’s meaning.
C. Practical Payoffs
To this point, we have argued that there are conceptual and theoretical merits
to treating the official comments to a Uniform Act as persuasive authority given
the directive a legislature issues when it adopts a promote-uniformity clause or
the signal it sends by adopting substantially unmodified portions of a Uniform
Act. Doing so also has significant practical benefits. Most obviously, applying
our proposed canon and attending to these directives or signals can bring
consistency to interpretations of the same provisions by courts in different
jurisdictions (or even in the same jurisdiction). This approach can also inform
courts about the policy approaches their legislature chose not to adopt in making
material modifications to the text of a Uniform Act. Perhaps most important, it
can help courts to avoid making easy cases hard through maladroit application
of textualist interpretive tools that do not fit the unique content and two-step
political economy of a state-enacted Uniform Act. We illustrate with three recent
cases,220 two in which the courts were oblivious to the uniform law context for
the question presented and one in which the court was sensitive to it.
1. Macool
We begin with In re Probate of Will & Codicil of Macool.221 Here is the
relevant background (applicable to the next case, too). Traditional law requires
217

Id. at 469.
Id. at 469 n.4.
219
Id. at 470 n.7.
220
All three cases involve trusts and estates, an area of law in which the ULC has been unusually
influential. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 38, at 2 (commending that uniform laws and restatements “are the
main sources that shape the law of trusts and estates at the national level”); SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note
111, at 71 (“The Uniform Law Commission, which promulgates uniform laws for enactment by the states, has
had a profound influence on the development of the law of wills, trusts, and estates.”).
221
3 A.3d 1258, 1261 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
218
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the execution of a will to comply with several statutory formalities.222 For
example, UPC section 2-502 requires a “formal” will to be in writing and signed
by the decedent (the “testator,” in wills jargon) and two witnesses; a
“holographic” will, by contrast, must be handwritten but need be signed only by
the decedent.223 Traditional law also requires strict compliance with these
statutory formalities. “Unless every last statutory formality is complied with
exactly, the instrument is” deemed invalid “even if there is compelling evidence
that the decedent intended the instrument to be his will.”224
To alleviate this harsh result, UPC section 2-503 reforms the strict
compliance rule by prescribing a “harmless error” rule. It provides that a
“document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance” with
the statutory formalities of UPC section 2-502 “if the proponent of the document
or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent
intended [it] to constitute . . . the decedent’s will.”225 The official comment
explains that the harmless error rule is meant to soften the formalism of the strict
compliance rule: “By way of dispensing power, this new section allows the
probate court to excuse a harmless error in complying with the formal
requirements for executing or revoking a will.”226 Even if the decedent did not
strictly comply with the prescribed statutory formalities, the court may
nonetheless probate the will if there is clear and convincing evidence that the
decedent intended the instrument to be her will.
The comment clarifies that the “larger the departure” from the formalities
required by UPC section 2-502, “the harder it will be to satisfy the court that the
instrument reflects the testator’s intent.”227 For example, the absence of the
decedent’s signature would be difficult to overcome but not impossible. Taking
notice of how foreign courts applied the harmless error rule, the comment
observes that the rule could be invoked to “excuse[] signature errors,”
particularly those arising in so-called “switched wills” cases in which two
testators, usually spouses, mistakenly sign each other’s will.228
Against this backdrop, the court in Macool was asked to decide as a matter
of law whether New Jersey’s enactment of UPC section 2-503 permits a court

222
223
224
225
226
227
228

See, e.g., SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 111, at 144–49.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a)–(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019).
SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 111, at 167.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019) (emphasis added).
Id. cmt.
Id.
Id.
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to probate a purported will lacking the decedent’s signature.229 To answer this
question, the court emphasized in textualist fashion the need to “turn to the
words chosen by the Legislature.”230 Oblivious to the origin of those words in a
Uniform Act, the court missed the legislature’s strong signal, stemming from its
nearly verbatim enactment of UPC section 2-503 rather than a bespoke
provision, to treat the comments accompanying UPC section 2-503 as persuasive
authority.231 Had the court been attuned to that signal, it would have recognized
that the official comment provided a clear answer to the question presented.
Instead, the court compared the text of the state’s enactment of section 2503 to other nearby text in the state’s probate code—a standard textualist
technique that, on the assumption of common authorship, finds context from
other duly enacted text.232 In this case, the court looked to the state’s enactment
of section 2-502.233
Recall that section 2-502 permits not only a formal will but also a
holographic one (that is, a handwritten will signed by the testator). Reasoning
that handwriting is “the essence of a holographic will,” the court concluded that

229

In re Probate of Will and Codicil of Macool, 3 A.3d 1258, 1265 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
Id. (emphasis added).
231
Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 2005) (“Although a document or writing added upon a
document was not executed in compliance with N.J.S.3B:3-2, the document or writing is treated as if it had been
executed in compliance with N.J.S.3B:3-2 if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and
convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute: (1) the decedent’s will;
(2) a partial or complete revocation of the will; (3) an addition to or an alteration of the will; or (4) a partial or
complete revival of his formerly revoked will or of a formerly revoked portion of the will.”), with UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 2-503 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019) (“Although a document or writing added upon a document was not
executed in compliance with section 2-502, the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in
compliance with that section if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute: (1) the decedent’s will, (2) a partial
or complete revocation of the will, (3) an addition to or an alteration of the will, or (4) a partial or complete
revival of [their] formerly revoked will or of a formerly revoked portion of the will.”).
232
See SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 18, at 168 (noting that, “[p]roperly applied,” this
canon “typically establishes . . . that one of the possible meanings [of a statutory provision] would cause [it] to
clash with another portion of the statute”); see also ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 203 (2006) (discussing the “strong presumption of textual
coherence” undergirding textualist interpretation); accord Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)
(“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted); Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 376 (1987) (plurality
opinion) (explaining that “the fact that Congress was silent in the [specific provision at issue] but has elsewhere
been explicit when it wished to exclude personal injury awards from income tends to refute rather than support
a legislative intent to exclude them from AFDC computations”); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S.
83, 101 (1991) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is not our function to eliminate clearly expressed inconsistency of policy
and to treat alike subjects that different Congresses have chosen to treat differently.”).
233
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 2005).
230
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“the only conceivable relief” that the harmless error rule could offer the
proponent of a defective holographic will would be to dispense with the
signature requirement.234 And because the harmless error rule of section 2-503
applies to all of section 2-502 (i.e., to both holographic and formal wills),
Macool generalized the point. Under section 2-503, the court held, a document
“need not be signed by the testator in order to be admitted to probate,” regardless
of whether the testator intended the document to be a holographic or formal
will.235
While the court was right about the bottom line, its blinkered textualism and
obliviousness to the accompanying comment added needless complexity and
risk of error. Rather than detouring through the requirements of holographic
wills under section 2-502 to divine the meaning of section 2-503 as applied to a
non-holographic will, the court need only have looked to the comment to section
2-503 for the answer to the question presented. As we have seen, the comment
to section 2-503 makes clear that its harmless error rule can forgive the absence
of a signature.236 Looking to the comment would have been in accord with the
strong signal the state legislature sent by enacting section 2-503 nearly verbatim.
Even on its own terms, the court’s reasoning was flawed. The court was
wrong that “the only conceivable relief” under the harmless error rule for a
holographic will is dispensing with the signature requirement. The state’s
enactment of section 2-502, like the uniform version, permits a holograph if “the
signature and material portions of the document are in the [decedent’s]
handwriting.”237 A purported holograph for which a “material” portion was not
in the decedent’s handwriting would fail for want of strict compliance with
section 2-502. But, under section 2-503, it could be saved by the harmless error
rule with clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the
insufficiently handwritten instrument to be their will.
There is yet another reason why the court’s reasoning was faulty. Suppose
the state legislature had dropped the holographic will provision of section 2-502
from its enactment of that section—in other words, suppose the state recognized
only formal wills and not holographs.238 The court’s reasoning suggests that this
choice would have led it to conclude that the harmless error rule could not

234

Macool, 3 A.3d at 1266.
Id.
236
See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
237
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-2(b) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
238
“[A] little more than half of the states” recognize holographic wills. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra
note 111, at 205.
235

ELINSONSITKOFF_6.15.22

2022]

6/21/2022 11:08 AM

TEXTUALISM AND UNIFORM ACTS

1119

forgive the absence of a testator’s signature in a formal will. But it would make
little sense to determine whether the harmless error rule can be invoked to excuse
the absence of a signature in a formal will by looking to whether the state permits
holographic wills.
All told, Macool ignored the legislature’s strong signal to treat the official
comment accompanying section 2-503 as persuasive authority by failing to
appreciate that the legislature enacted the provision virtually unmodified. The
court reached the result intended by the ULC’s drafters—but only out of sheer
luck, relying on a rigid textual analysis that was wrong on its own terms rather
than the clear statement of intent set forth in the accompanying comment.
2. Stoker
In re Estate of Stoker also involved a state-enacted version of UPC section
2-503.239 And it is also an example of a court misreading the signal its legislature
sent by adopting the ULC’s operative language.240 At issue was a dispute over
the estate of Steven Wayne Stoker that pitted his children from a previous
relationship against a more recent ex-girlfriend. While the ex-girlfriend was the
beneficiary of a will Stoker executed in 1997,241 the children had a 2005
document signed by Stoker that purported to revoke his earlier will and stated
his intention to leave them the entirety of his estate.242 The 2005 document,
however, was neither witnessed (as required for a formal will) nor was it in
Stoker’s handwriting (as required for a holographic will).243
At trial, a close friend of Stoker’s explained how the 2005 document was
prepared. One night in 2005, as talk turned to “estate planning,” Stoker asked
her to “get a piece of paper and a pen” so that he could dictate a new will cutting
out the ex-girlfriend.244 The friend testified that Stoker first signed the document,
then declared that it was his “last will and testament.”245 For the avoidance of
doubt, Stoker urinated on and then set fire to his copy of the 1997 will that had
favored the ex-girlfriend.246 Although the friend saw Stoker sign the 2005
document, neither she nor the other witness signed it.

239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246

122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 529, 533–34 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
See infra note 250.
In re Estate of Stoker, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 532–33.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 533–34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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There was no dispute that the 2005 writing could not be probated as a formal
will (for want of witnesses) or as a holograph (for want of Stoker’s
handwriting).247 But could it be probated under California’s enactment of section
2-503’s harmless error rule? The ex-girlfriend argued that it could not be, on the
ground that “the Legislature never intended this provision to apply to cases
involving handwritten documents.”248 The court disagreed,249 but gave no
acknowledgement of the provision’s origin in the UPC or the clear purpose as
stated in its official comment. Rather than attend to the signal the legislature sent
in adopting the operative language of section 2-503,250 the court instead treated
the provision as bespoke text drafted by the California legislature. That approach
resulted in a disjointed interpretation cobbled together from a confusing blend
of textualist principles and hoary maxims.
The court opened with standard textualist recitations of the need to discern
the “legislative intent underlying a statute” from “its language.”251 “Where the
statute is inclusive,”252 the court explained, “containing no limiting or qualifying
language to exclude persons from its scope, the words the legislators used should
control.”253 And in this case, it concluded, “[t]he statute contains no language to
indicate that the wills covered by this section are limited to typewritten wills.
Consequently, handwritten non-holographic wills are not excluded from the
scope of this statute.”254
Despite the court’s ostensible commitment to textualism, it then shifted to a
more purposive register. Invoking without apparent support the legislature’s
“broad and remedial goal” in enacting the harmless error provision, the court
247

Id.
Id. at 534.
249
Id.
250
Compare CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(c)(2) (2009) (“If a will was not executed in compliance with
paragraph (1), the will shall be treated as if it was executed in compliance with that paragraph if the proponent
of the will establishes by clear and convincing evidence that, at the time the testator signed the will, the testator
intended the will to constitute the testator’s will.”), with UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503(1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019)
(“Although a document or writing added upon a document was not executed in compliance with section 2-502,
the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of
the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document
or writing to constitute . . . the decedent’s will.”). The legislative history of California’s harmless error provision
makes clear that it is a “modified” version of UPC section 2-503. See S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Analysis of
A.B. 2248 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.) (June 10, 2008) (“The language of the harmless error rule in AB 2248 is a
modified version of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) 2-503 . . . .”). Nevertheless, California’s version of the
provision, unlike the Uniform version, does not excuse the absence of a signature.
251
In re Estate of Stoker, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 534.
252
Id.
253
Id. (emphasis added).
254
Id.
248
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explained that the legislature intended to “give preference to the testator’s intent
instead of invalidating wills because of procedural deficiencies or mistakes.”255
Thus, because section 2-503 was a “[r]emedial statute,” the court was obligated
to construe it “broadly and liberally . . . to promote the underlying legislative
goals.”256 And this liberal construction rule redounded to the benefit of Stoker’s
children.
Had the court been attuned to the signal the legislature sent by adopting the
key portions of the ULC’s version of section 2-503 and treated the official
comments as persuasive authority, it would not have needed to stitch together
textualism and purposivist interpretive maxims to justify its divination of
legislative intent. As we have seen, the comment makes clear that a will may be
probated so long as the proponent has clear and convincing evidence that the
decedent intended the written instrument—however prepared—to be their
will.257 As in Macool, the Stoker court’s obliviousness to the origin of the
provision at issue in a Uniform Act led it to undertake needless interpretive
gymnastics, turning an easy case into a hard one.
3. Darby
One final example, In re Trust D Under Last Will of Darby, brings together
much of the analysis developed thus far.258 Here is the relevant background.
UTC section 411 sets forth conditions for modifying or terminating a
noncharitable trust in certain circumstances. Subsection (b) describes one such
circumstance: a court may terminate a noncharitable trust “upon consent of all
of the beneficiaries,” provided that it “concludes that continuance of the trust is
not necessary to achieve any material purpose of the trust.”259 Subsection (c)
provides that a “spendthrift provision,” a provision that protects a beneficiary’s
interest in the trust from her creditors, “is not presumed to constitute a material
purpose of the trust.”260
As explained in the official comment, subsection (c) is meant to confirm that
a spendthrift clause, which is customary boilerplate, may—but need not—signal
that the trust’s creator (the “settlor,” in trust jargon) had a material purpose of
255

Id.
Id.
257
See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
258
234 P.3d 793 (Kan. 2010).
259
UNIF. TR. CODE § 411(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010). This is the Claflin rule, after Claflin v. Claflin, 20
N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889).
260
UNIF. TR. CODE § 411(c) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (emphasis added). On spendthrift provisions, see
SITKOFF AND DUKEMINIER, supra note 111, at 709–17.
256
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creditor protection.261 Under subsection (c), therefore, discerning whether
“spendthrift protection might have been a material purpose” is “a matter of fact
to be determined on the totality of the circumstances,” rather than categorically
presumed from the fact of such a clause.262 When the Kansas legislature enacted
the UTC, however, it deleted the word “not” from its version of subsection (c).263
In Kansas, therefore (at least at the time Darby was decided), a spendthrift
provision was presumed to constitute a material purpose of the trust, precluding
a court from modifying or terminating the trust even upon consent of all the
beneficiaries.264
The court in Darby was asked to determine whether the settlor’s daughter
could modify her father’s trust to increase her annual distributions.265 Her own
daughters (the settlor’s granddaughters), who were slated to receive distributions
from the trust upon their mother’s death, consented to the change.266 Even
though they stood to receive less from their grandfather’s trust under the
modification, they agreed with their mother that the money she was receiving
from the trust (her primary source of financial support) was “no longer sufficient
to satisfy [her] basic living expenses.”267
Notwithstanding the granddaughters’ consent, the court rejected the
proposed modification because the trust contained a spendthrift provision. “In
Kansas,” the court explained, “a spendthrift provision is presumed to constitute
a material purpose of the trust.”268 Noting that this was “in material contrast to
the Uniform Trust Code, which specifically negates any such presumption,”
Darby held that the modification sought by the daughter would be “inconsistent
with the material purpose manifested by the spendthrift provision.”269
261

UNIF. TR. CODE § 411 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010).
Id.
263
Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-411(c) (2006) (“A spendthrift provision in the terms of the trust is
presumed to constitute a material purpose of the trust.”) (emphasis added), with UNIF. TR. CODE § 411(c) (UNIF.
L. COMM’N 2010) (“A spendthrift provision in the terms of the trust is not presumed to constitute a material
purpose of the trust.”) (emphasis added). In 2012, the Kansas legislature amended the state’s enacted version of
UTC section 411 to undo this deletion. Thus, the current, post-Darby, version of the statute is identical to the
version promulgated by the ULC. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-411(c) (2012).
264
Responding to similar changes made by state legislatures across the county, the ULC ultimately made
the provision “optional” by placing it in brackets. UNIF. TR. CODE § 411 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010). Other
states have enacted UTC section 411(c) with the bracketed “not.” See, e.g., In re Pike Family Trusts, 38 A.3d
329, 332 (Me. 2012) (noting that, “[e]ven in the absence of any presumption, a court may conclude that a
spendthrift provision was a material provision of the settlor”).
265
In re Trust D Under Last Will of Darby, 234 P.3d 793, 797–98 (Kan. 2010).
266
Id.
267
Id. at 798 (alteration in original).
268
Id. at 799.
269
Id. at 800.
262
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Darby’s straightforward—and, in our view, correct—analysis flows directly
from the court’s receptivity to the signal sent by the Kansas legislature when it
enacted a materially modified version of UTC section 411(c). The court
recognized that the Kansas legislature largely chose to adopt the ULC’s off-therack text.270 But it also recognized that the legislature made a key modification,
reversing the ULC’s rule that spendthrift provisions are not presumptive
material purposes.271 Even in this context, however, the comment could have
proved useful to the court in making clear exactly what policy the legislature
had chosen to reject by deleting the word “not” in the blackletter text.
In all events, the court’s doctrinal moves reflect a textualism sensitive to the
two-step political economy undergirding Kansas’s enactment of the UTC. Its
holding reflects an awareness of the ULC’s role in promulgating state statutes
and the possible complications that result from state enactment, including
outright rejection of the ULC’s policy choices. That kind of awareness should
result in treating the ULC’s comments as persuasive guides to the meaning of
the statutory text. Of course, that the Kansas UTC is not entirely “Uniform” is
suggestive of broader puzzles and extensions, to which we now turn.
IV. INTERPRETIVE CHALLENGES AND LIMITS
Darby points to a broader set of puzzles and complications arising from
hybrid cases in which a legislature modifies the ULC’s text and, in so doing,
potentially generates a mixed signal. In Darby, the legislature’s signal was clear.
By enacting the UTC but deleting the word “not” in the provision at issue, the
legislature indicated through the text that it rejected the ULC’s policy choice.
Darby read that signal correctly, recognizing that it was not encountering a
bespoke provision but instead a modified version of text initially promulgated
by the ULC. In other hybrid cases, however, recognizing the Uniform origin of
the legislative text does not generate a clear interpretive logic. In these situations,
the text makes it difficult to discern the strength of the signal, or even to
determine whether a signal is being sent at all. Examining these cases therefore
allows us to mark some of the boundaries of our interpretive canon and to be
frank about its limitations.
To that end, we now take up four problems stemming from the collision of
textualism and the unique content and two-step political economy of stateenacted Uniform Acts. These illustrations, which are not exhaustive, are

270
271

Id. at 799–800.
Id.
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suggestive of the myriad challenges facing courts charged with interpreting a
Uniform Act outside of the heartland case of clean enactment. Indeed, we have
only scratched the surface of possible puzzles and complications. Our aim is to
identify the sort of provocative complexities that result from applying our
interpretive canon to a range of difficult cases outside of a clean enactment of a
Uniform Act.
The first two problems arise from a legislature’s combining text from a
Uniform Act with bespoke statutory language, either assimilating Uniform text
into an existing bespoke statute or simultaneously enacting related Uniform and
bespoke provisions. The third problem concerns legislative silence. What signal
is sent when the legislature does not enact part of a Uniform Act, remaining
silent on the subject matter of the omitted provision, even as it embraces the rest
of the ULC’s promulgated text? Finally, the fourth problem concerns how
textualists should treat the ULC’s own legislative history, including earlier drafts
or floor statements by Commissioners.
A. The Problem of Assimilation
State legislatures regularly assimilate text from a Uniform Act into their
existing body of law, updating non-Uniform “legacy” statutes with language
from the (usually) newer Uniform Act.272 This kind of assimilation results in a
hybrid statute that blends legacy and Uniform Act statutory text. In contrast to a
clean enactment of text from a Uniform Act, these Uniform-legacy hybrids send
a fuzzier textual signal about the proper role of the Uniform Act’s accompanying
commentary.
To make this point more concrete, consider the following scenario based on
In re Estate of Castro, a much-discussed Ohio case.273 A dying man asked his
two brothers to help him make a will. At his direction, one used an electronic
tablet to write out the text of the will with a stylus. The tablet captured the stylus
movements as a digital image. The dying man then used the stylus to sign his
name at the bottom, as did his two brothers plus a third witness. After the man
died, one of the brothers preserved the tablet image. As is typical, the applicable

272
See, e.g., ILL. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, supra note 110, at 173 (“An Act may be partly derived from
a Uniform Act but may have other material that is not derived from a Uniform Act.”).
273
In re: Estate of Javier Castro, Deceased, 27 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 412, 414 (2014) [hereinafter In re
Castro] (decided June 19, 2013 in the Probate Division of Lorain County, Ohio). Castro is discussed in SITKOFF
& DUKEMINIER, supra note 111, at 200–01 (with an image of the will), and in the prefatory note to the Uniform
Electronic Wills Act. See UNIF. ELECTRONIC WILLS ACT pref. note (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019). We have freely
simplified from the actual case for expositional clarity.
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will formalities statute required that a will be “in writing” but did not define the
term.274
The threshold question, therefore, was whether a digital image of stylus
movements on a tablet was a “writing” within the statute’s meaning. The statute
was a hybrid of legacy text from the state’s preexisting will formalities statute
and additional text drawn from section 2-502 of the UPC.275 In substance, it
closely resembles UPC section 2-502(a).276 Indeed, although the requirement of
a “writing” was prescribed by the preexisting legacy text,277 section 2-502 also
contains that same requirement.278 Thus, for our purposes, the key question is
this: Did the assimilation into the preexisting statute of portions of section 2502—but not the specific term at issue (a “writing”), which was already in the
statute and so predated the assimilation—signal that overlapping terms, such as
a “writing,” should be given the meaning that the ULC ascribed to them? The
official comment to section 2-502 explains that “[a]ny reasonably permanent
record is sufficient” to qualify as a “writing.”279 If applicable, this comment
would likely have made short work of the case, as there was no dispute that the
digital image had captured the words of the will and signatures and that it had
been preserved unaltered.280
What makes the question difficult is the ambiguous nature of the textual
signal. On the one hand, the legislature assimilated language from UPC section
2-502 into the legacy statute, making the resulting hybrid substantively identical
274

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (2006) (emphasis added).
See 2008 Ohio Laws 100 (S.B. 302) (effective Sept. 11, 2008) (adding “conscious presence” from
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019)); 2006 Ohio Laws 96 (H.B. 265) (effective July 20, 2006)
(enacting a version of the harmless error rule set forth in UNIF. PROB. CODE § 203 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019)).
276
Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (2006) (“Except oral wills, every will shall be in writing,
but may be handwritten or typewritten. The will shall be signed at the end by the testator or by some other person
in the testator’s conscious presence and at the testator’s express direction. The will shall be attested and
subscribed in the conscious presence of the testator, by two or more competent witnesses, who saw the testator
subscribe, or heard the testator acknowledge the testator’s signature. For purposes of this section, ‘conscious
presence’ means within the range of any of the testator’s senses, excluding the sense of sight or sound that is
sensed by telephonic, electronic, or other distant communication.”), with UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a) (UNIF.
L. COMM’N 2019) (“Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and in Sections 2-503, 2-506, and 2-513, a
will must be: (1) in writing; (2) signed by the testator or in the testator’s name by some other individual in the
testator’s conscious presence and by the testator’s direction; and (3) either: (A) signed by at least two individuals,
each of whom signed within a reasonable time after the individual witnessed either the signing of the will as
described in paragraph (2) or the testator’s acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgement of the will;
or (B) acknowledged by the testator before a notary public or other individual authorized by law to take
acknowledgements.”).
277
See supra note 275 (describing the 2008 amendments to Ohio’s will formalities statute).
278
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019).
279
Id. cmt.
280
In re Castro, supra note 273, at 415.
275
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to its UPC cousin.281 In addition, the legislature enacted a version of section 2503, the UPC’s harmless error provision.282 A plausible inference from the text,
therefore, is that the legislature was assimilating the new language with attention
to its source. If true, this case should be treated as though it were a clean
enactment of a Uniform Act provision. That is, the choice to enact these words,
yielding a legacy-uniform hybrid statute that in substance closely resembles
section 2-502, is persuasive evidence that the new, hybrid provision should be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the way the ULC intended section 2-502
to work.
On the other hand, the signal here is weaker than in a heartland signals case,
as the state legislature did not adopt section 2-502 in its entirety.283 Perhaps the
decision to assimilate language from the UPC, rather than enact it as a standalone provision, reflected the legislature’s reluctance to tinker with preexisting
statutory language that was sufficiently similar to the ULC’s legislative product
as not to warrant a wholesale change. But perhaps it was a deliberate choice to
depart from the ULC’s approach.
Ignoring these complexities, and seemingly oblivious to the hybrid nature of
the text, the court looked to how the term “writing” was used in a provision of
the state’s criminal code pertaining to theft and fraud.284 Reasoning that the
preserved tablet image would satisfy the criminal statute’s definition of a
“writing,” the court held it was also a “writing” for purposes of the will
formalities statute.285 The court gave no explanation for why this definition from
the criminal code was apt other than implied common legislative authorship.

281

See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.24(A) (2012) (“If a document that is executed that purports to
be a will is not executed in compliance with the requirements of section 2107.03 of the Revised Code, that
document shall be treated as if it had been executed as a will in compliance with the requirements of that section
if a probate court, after holding a hearing, finds that the proponent of the document as a purported will has
established, by clear and convincing evidence, all of the following: (1) The decedent prepared the document or
caused the document to be prepared. (2) The decedent signed the document and intended the document to
constitute the decedent’s will. (3) The decedent signed the document under division (A)(2) of this section in the
conscious presence of two or more witnesses.”), with UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019)
(“Although a document or writing added upon a document was not executed in compliance with section 2-502,
the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of
the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document
or writing to constitute: (1) the decedent’s will, (2) a partial or complete revocation of the will, (3) an addition
to or an alteration of the will, or (4) a partial or complete revival of his [or her] formerly revoked will or of a
formerly revoked portion of the will.”).
283
See supra note 276.
284
In re Castro, supra note 273, at 416 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.01(F)).
285
Id.
282
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We have already seen a version of this move in Macool, in which both the
statute at issue and the comparison provision were taken verbatim from the
UPC.286 As such, it was appropriate to apply the presumption of textual
coherence grounded in common legislative authorship.287 But unlike in Macool,
in which the court drew a flawed inference from a reasonable comparison, here
our canon suggests that the court in Castro made a category error. Although the
hybrid will formalities statute is formally bespoke, the legislature’s assimilation
of Uniform text, such that the hybrid statute closely resembles UPC section 2502, suggests that it should be interpreted as if it were a provision of a Uniform
Act. On this view, the provision at issue and the comparison provision in the
state’s criminal code lack the common author that underlies the presumption of
textual coherence. There is little reason to think that the meaning of the term
“writing” in the bespoke criminal provision sheds any light on the meaning of
that same term in the effectively Uniform will formalities statute.
To be sure, the term “writing” in the hybrid will formalities statute predates
the state’s assimilation of other text from UPC section 2-502.288 But the textual
similarity between the hybrid statute and UPC section 2-502 suggests that the
resemblance is not coincidental. And to the extent the text suggests an intent to
align existing state law with the UPC—that is, to draw on the ULC’s language
by virtue of its provenance—it follows that common terms in the hybrid statute
were meant to have the same meaning as in the Uniform version. At a minimum,
the textual evidence suggests that the comment to section 2-502 would seem a
more apt interpretive source than drawing inferences from a comparison to an
unrelated criminal provision. On legislative supremacy or faithful agency
grounds, the court should have accounted for the extent of the substantive
resemblance between the hybrid statute and its Uniform counterpart and
interpret it accordingly.
B. The Problem of Simultaneous Enactment
State legislatures can also produce a hybrid statute by simultaneously
enacting a bespoke statutory provision and a Uniform one that address a related
topic. This kind of enactment challenges our argument that courts make a
category error by drawing inferences from a comparison of Uniform and

286

See supra Part III.C.1.
See supra note 232 (describing the presumption); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 18, at 173
(explaining that “the more connection the cited statute has with the statute under consideration, the more
plausible” the presumption of consistent usage).
288
See supra note 275.
287
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bespoke statutory text. In this situation, drawing a meaningful inference from a
comparison of the Uniform and bespoke provisions seems more plausible.289
To illustrate, take the following example based on In re Heller, decided by
New York’s high court.290 Here is the relevant context. Trusts are commonly
drafted to provide “income” to a life beneficiary (often the settlor’s surviving
spouse), with the remainder, known as the “principal,” to be paid to successor
beneficiaries (often the settlor’s children).291 Under traditional law, the
classification of trust property as “income” or “principal” was based on form
rather than economic substance.292 As a result, trustees often had to skew the
trust portfolio to produce returns with the desired ratio of income to principal,
even if a different portfolio offered a better overall return.293 Such skewing was
especially fraught in the recurring case of a second spouse as the income
beneficiary and children from a first marriage as the remainder principal
beneficiaries.294
To resolve the problem, two reforms took hold. One, a 1997 revision to the
Uniform Principal and Income Act, gives a trustee the power to adjust between
income and principal.295 With this reform, a trustee can invest for maximum total
return and then allocate those returns to either income or principal. The second
is the so-called “unitrust.”296 Under this reform, which the ULC did not adopt in
the 1997 revision to the Uniform Principal and Income Act but many states later
adopted with bespoke language, the “income” beneficiary is paid a set
percentage of the value of the trust corpus. By transforming the “income”
interest into a percentage claim on the total value, the unitrust reform allows the
trustee to invest for total return without worrying about its form.297

289
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 18, at 173 (noting that the presumption of consistent usage is
“persuasive” when the statute at issue “was enacted at the same time, and dealt with the same subject” as the
comparison statute).
290
849 N.E.2d 262 (N.Y. 2006). We have freely simplified from the actual case for expositional clarity.
291
See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 111, at 675–76.
292
See id. For example, interest, cash dividends, and rent were considered income, while appreciation in
stocks, bonds, or land was considered principal. See id.
293
Id.
294
See id.
295
UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 104(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1997) (“A trustee may adjust between
principal and income to the extent the trustee considers necessary if the trustee invests and manages trust assets
as a prudent investor, the terms of the trust describe the amount that may or must be distributed to a beneficiary
by referring to the trust’s income, and the trustee determines, after applying the [formal principal and income
rules], that the trustee is unable to comply with [the duty of impartiality].”).
296
See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 111, at 676.
297
See id. The ULC finally adopted a unitrust provision in 2019. See UNIF. FIDUCIARY INCOME AND
PRINCIPAL ACT §§ 301–309 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019).
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In Heller, the question presented was whether the trustees of a classic
principal-and-income trust could invoke the state’s unitrust provision.298 The
trustees were children from the settlor’s first marriage and the remainder
principal beneficiaries; the income beneficiary was the settlor’s second wife,
their stepmother. The case arose because the conversion would reduce the
stepmother’s yearly distributions while increasing the value of the trustees’ own
remainder interest—arguably a form of impermissible self-dealing.
To answer the question, the court observed that the legislature enacted both
a unitrust conversion statute and an adjustment power statute in the same
legislative session.299 The adjustment power statute, a verbatim enactment of the
1997 revision to the Uniform Principal and Income act, “expressly prohibits a
trustee from exercising this power if ‘the trustee is a current beneficiary or a
presumptive remainderman.’”300 But, “[t]ellingly,” the court explained, “the
Legislature included no such prohibition in the simultaneously enacted optional
unitrust provision.”301 Based on this textual comparison of the two statutes, one
Uniform and the other bespoke, the court inferred that “the Legislature did not
mean to prohibit trustees who have a beneficial interest from electing unitrust
treatment.”302
Was the court’s negative inference sound? Ordinarily, we have argued,
courts should be wary of a negative inference that, like this one, is drawn from
a comparison between Uniform and bespoke provisions. As we explained in
criticizing Castro’s recourse to a bespoke criminal provision to define the term
“writing,” the concern stems from the weakened presumption of common
authorship. But that concern of category error has less force here. During the
single legislative session in which it enacted both provisions, each addressing
the same issue, the legislature could have made conforming changes to either
the bespoke provision or the Uniform one. Given the textualist axiom that a
legislature chooses its words with care, the legislature’s decision not to do so is
meaningful. The unitrust statute does not contain the corresponding prohibition
contained in the state’s enactment of the Uniform Principal and Income Act. On
faithful agency or legislative supremacy grounds, reviewing courts must respect

298

In re Heller, 849 N.E.2d 262, 263 (N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 264–65.
300
Id. at 265–66 (quoting N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(5) (McKinney 2002)). Instead,
lawmakers set forth “a list of factors to be considered by the courts in determining whether unitrust treatment
should apply to a trust.” Id.
301
Id. at 266.
302
Id.
299
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the legislature’s choice to prescribe a difference between these two related
provisions.
Nevertheless, given that the two provisions at issue here do in fact have
different authors, we cannot rule out the possibility that the textual distinction
the court identified sheds no interpretive light at all. It may simply be an artifact
of the provisions’ different origins. Our proposed canon therefore leads us to
this modest conclusion. Had the court made reference to the statutes’ different
origins and acknowledged it was making the best of the textual evidence at hand,
the negative inference it drew might have been more credible. In the end, it is
not apparent that in this situation there were better inferences to be drawn from
the text.303
C. The Problem of Omission
Let us turn now to yet another complication. Instead of negating a Uniform
Act provision in duly enacted text, as the Kansas legislature did in Darby, state
legislatures sometimes omit a provision without enacting anything in its place,
even while enacting substantially all of the rest of the Uniform Act. What kind
of signal does this send to reviewing courts?
To explore this question, consider the following scenario, loosely drawn
from Wilson v. Wilson.304 A settlor established a trust for the benefit of his two
children. In the trust instrument, he provided that the trustee would not be
required to make account statements available to the beneficiaries, even upon
their request. The beneficiaries later sued the trustee, alleging that he squandered
the trust assets in a series of bad investments and demanding a complete
accounting. Pointing to the trust instrument’s terms, the trustee refused to
provide discovery, so the beneficiaries sought a ruling from the court.

303
As a coda, we observe that Heller’s holding finds strong support in both background common law and
policy. As to the former, while the common law categorically prohibits conflicted action by a trustee, that
prohibition does not apply to a conflict that is authorized by the settlor, which is instead subject to enhanced
scrutiny. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78 cmt. c(2) (2007). By naming his sons as remainder beneficiaries
and successor trustees, the settlor impliedly authorized the relevant conflict. As to policy, in contrast to the highly
discretionary adjustment power, the fixed formula of a unitrust confers limited freedom of movement on the
trustee. Once converted to a unitrust, the formula itself allocates returns between the “income” and “principal”
beneficiaries without trustee discretion. For this reason, it makes sense to encourage structurally conflicted
trustees to resolve the principal-income problem with a unitrust. The court, however, did not consider this
common law background and policy context, resting its holding on a textual negative inference from presumptive
common authorship.
304
690 S.E.2d 710, 711 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010). We present simplified facts inspired by the actual case for
expositional clarity.

ELINSONSITKOFF_6.15.22

2022]

6/21/2022 11:08 AM

TEXTUALISM AND UNIFORM ACTS

1131

The state legislature had largely enacted the UTC as promulgated. But it
made a crucial modification. In both the Uniform and the state-enacted versions,
UTC section 105(b) prescribes a set of mandatory rules that cannot be varied by
the terms of a trust.305 In contrast to the Uniform version, however, which (in
brackets) makes mandatory the trustee’s duty to inform and report as codified
by UTC section 813,306 the state’s enacted version of section 105(b) omitted the
reference to section 813 from its list of mandatory rules.307 Unlike in Darby,
therefore, the state legislature did not enact a textual reversal of the ULC’s rule
that settlors cannot modify the trustee’s duty to inform and report. Instead, it
omitted the rule from its enactment, replacing it with nothing.
Some courts have suggested that a legislature’s decision to omit part of a
Uniform Act is equivalent to a Darby-like reversal. As the West Virginia
Supreme Court has said, “when a uniform or model act in an area of law contains
a certain provision, but the Legislature fails to adopt that provision when
adopting other parts of the act, courts usually conclude that the Legislature
intended to reject the provision and the policy goals that accompanied the
provision.”308 This view is often grounded in the twin textualist principles of
legislative supremacy and faithful agency. Consider this explanation from the
Nebraska Supreme Court:
The intent of the Legislature is expressed by omission as well as by
inclusion. Had the Legislature desired to apply [the relevant bespoke
statute, which by its terms applied only to wills] to trusts, it could have
adopted § 112 of the [UTC]. But it did not. Nor will we do so by
judicial fiat in the guise of statutory interpretation.309

On this view, by omitting the duty to inform and report from the list of
mandatory rules that cannot be varied by the terms of the trust, the legislature
rejected the ULC’s policy choice and permitted the settlor to negate the
beneficiaries’ right to the discovery they sought.
But, as we have seen, textualists also argue that making law requires the
legislature to enact text that clears the constitutional hurdles of bicameralism and

305

See UNIF. TR. CODE § 105(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010).
See id. § 105(b)(8)–(9).
307
Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36C-1-105 (West 2021) (omitting any reference to the state’s
enacted version of UTC § 813 in listing provisions of state law that “prevail” over a trust’s terms), with UNIF.
TR. CODE § 105 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (listing UTC § 813 as among the provisions of the UTC that “prevail”
over a trust’s terms).
308
See, e.g., John A. Sheppard Mem’l Ecological Rsrv., Inc. v. Fanning, 836 S.E.2d 426, 431 (W. Va.
2019); In re Marriage of Thatcher, 864 N.W.2d 533, 541 (Iowa 2015) (similar).
309
In re Estate of Radford, 933 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Neb. 2019) (emphasis added).
306
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presentment.310 Treating a legislative non-enactment as law—that is, treating
omission as equivalent to a textual negation—would allow the legislature to
make law without following the constitutionally prescribed steps. To see why,
compare the enactment process here to the one in Darby. In that case, proponents
of deleting the word “not” succeeded in cobbling together a winning coalition
such that the enacted text reflected the opposite of the ULC rule.311 In this one,
by contrast, proponents of making nonmandatory the duty to inform and report
succeeded only in deleting the ULC’s rule rather than explicitly negating it. On
this view, owing to the omission, there was no statutory text to answer the
question presented, leaving it to be resolved by application of background
common law principles.312
Other textual clues may help in adjudicating between these two possibilities.
In the case on which this discussion is based, the court looked to the enacted
parts of UTC section 105(b). It observed that, even under the state-enacted
version, the terms of the trust may not override either the trustee’s “duty . . . to
act in good faith . . . and in the interests of the beneficiaries” or the court’s
“power . . . to take such action as may be necessary in the interests of justice.”313
The court seized on these unmodified provisions to rule in the beneficiaries’
favor.314 It held that, taken together, the mandatory rules prescribed by these
provisions trumped the terms of the trust and conferred on the court “the power
. . . to compel discovery where necessary to enforce the beneficiary’s rights
under the trust or to prevent or redress a breach of trust.”315
This approach has the virtue of being grounded in duly enacted text. But the
court’s refusal to make anything of the legislature’s exclusion of the duty to
inform and report from the list of mandatory rules is at least potentially in tension
with the textualist ideals of legislative supremacy and faithful agency. After all,
the legislature could have adopted the UTC rule but did not.316 We are left to
conclude that our proposed interpretive canon reveals an uncomfortable tension

310

See supra Part II.A.
See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
312
In the specific case of the UTC, this result is mandated by the text of section 106, which the state
legislature enacted nearly verbatim. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36C-1-106 (2013) (“The common law of
trusts and principles of equity supplement this Chapter, except to the extent modified by this Chapter or another
statute of this State.”), with UNIF. TR. CODE § 106 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (“The common law of trusts and
principles of equity supplement this [Code], except to the extent modified by this [Code] or another statute of
this State.”) (brackets in original).
313
Wilson v. Wilson, 690 S.E.2d 710, 714–15 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-1-105 (2009)).
314
Id. at 716.
315
Id.
316
See In re Estate of Radford, 933 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Neb. 2019).
311

ELINSONSITKOFF_6.15.22

2022]

6/21/2022 11:08 AM

TEXTUALISM AND UNIFORM ACTS

1133

within textualism itself. When a reviewing court privileges the enacted parts of
the Uniform Act over omissions, it risks sacrificing these ideals in favor of
fidelity to text. But when it prioritizes omissions, it risks treating unenacted text
as if it were law, without the legislature having followed the constitutionally
prescribed steps necessary to make it so.317
D. The Problem of the ULC’s Internal Legislative History
We have argued that textualist principles obligate courts to treat the official
comments accompanying a Uniform Act—a form of legislative history—as
persuasive authorities to a statute’s meaning. But what about other legislative
history internal to the ULC, such as early drafts of Uniform Acts or debates
within the drafting committee or on the chamber floor?
To illustrate, consider the following scenario, loosely drawn from In re Last
Will and Testament of Moor.318 UPC section 2-513 permits a testator to reference
in her will a “written statement or list,” separate from the will itself, “to dispose
of items of tangible personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by
the will, other than money.”319 This provision, which is “premised on the
assumption that tangible personalty is typically of small value,”320 relaxes the
traditional will formalities for such items,321 permitting a testator to use an
unwitnessed, unsigned document to distribute personal property.
Invoking this provision, a testator appended an unwitnessed memo to her
will directing that certain tangible personal property was “to be auctioned,” with
the cash proceeds ($160,000) distributed to certain named recipients.322 The
testator’s niece and a friend challenged this directive, contending that it was in
effect an impermissible bequest of “money” via an unsigned, unwitnessed

317
Beyond the question of whether non-enactment is equivalent to rejection, a second question is worthy
of brief mention. May a textualist court draw a negative inference from comparing an enacted Uniform Act
provision with a related provision (in the same Uniform Act) that the legislature has not enacted, given that both
were drafted in the first instance by the ULC? This is another variant on the ambiguities arising from textual
comparisons involving a Uniform Act and a bespoke statute. Traditional textualism would view the decision not
to enact as a signal that the unenacted provision may not considered. But does the unenacted provision
nevertheless provide meaningful contextual information about the ULC’s intent in promulgating the enacted one
(i.e., the intent that the legislature endorsed in duly enacted text)?
318
879 A.2d 648, 649–50 (Del. Ch. 2005). We have freely simplified from the actual case for expositional
clarity.
319
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-513 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019) (emphasis added); see Moor, 879 A.2d at 653–54
n.9 (discussing differences between the Florida statute and UPC § 2-513).
320
See Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1106 n.142 (1996).
321
Moor, 879 A.2d at 654.
322
Id. at 650.
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document.323 Notably, an early draft of UPC section 2-513 prescribed a dollar
limit on the value of the property that could be “disposed of” in this fashion.324
But the ULC did not adopt the limit in the final, promulgated version (and
neither did the state legislature).325 On the facts of Moor, this legislative history
would tend to validate the testator’s directive, which well exceeded the proposed
limit, even accounting for inflation.326
There is a textualist case that the ULC’s legislative history—as distinct from
that of the state legislature—is permissible evidence for courts to consider. As
we have argued, the text of an enacted Uniform Act either directs or signals
courts to interpret the statute in a manner consistent with the ULC’s policy
design. And, in principle, the ULC’s decision not to adopt the limit could be
helpful in determining how the ULC meant for the provision to work.327 To that
extent, taking the ULC’s internal legislative history into account could help
courts implement the legislature’s textual directive or receive its textual signal.
Much like the official comments, this evidence can help assure substantive
uniformity across jurisdictions and so give effect to the legislature’s intent in
enacting a Uniform Act.
But because the ULC disclaims this kind of legislative history (including
early drafts or records of drafting committee or floor debates) as not
authoritative,328 the ULC’s legislative history does not count for exactly the
323

Id. at 651.
Hirsch, supra note 320, at 1106 n.9; SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 111, at 261.
325
Hirsch, supra note 320, at 1106 n.9; SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 111, at 261. California has
enacted dollar limits on the property that can be passed by separate document or list. No single item can be worth
more than $5,000 and the total cannot exceed $25,000. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6132 (West 2007).
326
The actual case was resolved on textual grounds. The court rejected the challengers’ argument, holding
that they “would read into the statutory text words of restriction that were not included by the relevant
legislatures.” Moor, 879 A.2d at 652. Moor reasoned that the statute “use[d] the broad term ‘dispose’ of . . . to
refer to an elastic range of activities.” Id. In fact, the text “preclude[ed]” only “intangible property . . . from
being devised through a separate writing.” Id. at 653. But “[a]ll of the property covered” by the memo was
“tangible.” Id. The only tweak was that the testator used the memo to direct that the tangible property first be
sold and then the proceeds transferred to those identified in the memo. As the court put it, she “‘disposed of’ her
personal property by directing her executors to sell that property and distribute the proceeds to specific persons.”
Id.
327
See Baude & Doerfler, supra note 30, at 548 (suggesting that considering legislative history even when
the meaning of the text is clear is at worst harmless and at best illuminating).
328
See, e.g., Directed Trust Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N (June 2016), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/
System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=58f2c268-8d67-9c9d-b5e7-4c9e98a9e1c3&forceDi
alog=0 (“The ideas and conclusions set forth in this draft, including the proposed statutory language and any
comments or reporter’s notes, have not been passed upon by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws or the Drafting Committee. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Conference and
its Commissioners and the Drafting Committee and its Members and Reporter. Proposed statutory language
324
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same reason the official comments do. Relying on the ULC’s legislative history
is inconsistent with the ULC’s intent about how a Uniform Act should be
interpreted. As we have argued throughout, the enactment of a Uniform Act
makes the meaning the ULC ascribed to a provision controlling, and the ULC
says explicitly that its legislative history is off limits in determining that
meaning.
We have also argued that relying on the official comments better enables
courts to respect the principles of legislative supremacy and faithful agency
precisely because all of them will be working from the same, closed set of
materials. But taking into account the ULC’s own legislative history vastly
expands the universe of available evidence, increasing the discretion of
individual courts. Which early draft best reflects the ULC’s intent? Should later
drafts get priority? What of conflicts between recorded floor statements that
commissioners might make? Looking to the ULC’s legislative history could
make it less likely that two courts looking at the same provision will truly act as
neutral umpires applying the same strike zone.329
This discussion delimits an important boundary of our proposed interpretive
canon. Given the foundational commitments of textualism, the official
comments should be treated as persuasive guides to a statute’s meaning, but
previous drafts of a Uniform Act, together with any other legislative-historical
materials the ULC might preserve, such as floor or committee statements, should
not be considered.330

may not be used to ascertain the intent or meaning of any promulgated final statutory proposal.”) (emphasis
added).
329
See supra note 153 and accompanying text. As D.C. Circuit Judge Harold Leventhal famously put it,
the challenge in this context is that using legislative history is sometimes akin to “looking over a crowd and
picking out your friends.” Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214–15 (1983).
330
Post-enactment emanations from the ULC are also interesting. For example, may a textualist court
consider a nonsubstantive technical amendment to the text of an enacted Uniform Act made by the ULC after
the state legislature enacted the original version? See, e.g., UNIF. TR. CODE § 603 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010)
(noting that a further clarifying amendment to UTC section 603 changed the phrase “While a trust is revocable”
in what had been subsection (a) and is now subsection (b) to “To the extent a trust is revocable” and commenting
further, “No substantive change was intended by this amendment. The revised language more clearly recognizes
that a trust may be revocable in part and irrevocable in part or that a trust may have more than one settlor. In
such a trust, a settlor’s powers enumerated in this section apply only to the extent the trust is revocable by that
settlor” (emphasis added)). Likewise, may a textualist court consider amendments to the official comments of a
Uniform Act made by the ULC after the legislature enacted the Act? See, e.g., UNIF. TR. CODE § 413 cmt. (UNIF.
L. COMM’N 2010) (“The penultimate paragraph of this Comment was amended in 2017 to cite the Restatement
of Charitable Nonprofit Organizations and to disapprove of dictum in Williams v. City of Kuttawa.”). These
questions point to some possible tensions within textualism about whether the original public meaning of a stateenacted Uniform Act is subject to change because of the ULC’s subsequent legislative activity.
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CONCLUSION
Textualism is often justified as a one-size-fits-all methodology. Any text can
be interpreted by applying its straightforward precepts. But context matters, as
contemporary textualists readily acknowledge. When courts fail to attend to the
unique content and two-step political economy of Uniform Acts, they risk
violating the central tenet of this interpretive approach—to give meaning to the
legislature’s choice to enact these words, rather than some other alternative.
When a state legislature adopts a Uniform Act, it usually includes the Act’s
promote-uniformity clause. The clause directs reviewing courts to treat the
comments accompanying each blackletter provision of the Act as persuasive
guides to the statute’s meaning. But even in cases in which the legislature does
not enact the promote-uniformity clause, the enacted text nevertheless signals to
reviewing courts that they should treat the accompanying comments as
persuasive authorities on the statute’s meaning. The strength of that signal
depends on the nature and extent of the modifications, if any, that the legislature
makes to the Uniform Act as promulgated by the ULC.
Taken together, these directives and signals transform what observers have
long considered to be a core principle of textualism: its rejection of legislative
history. Applied to state statutes originating as Uniform Acts, textualism’s
foundational commitments suggest that courts must embrace the ULC’s
statement of intent as laid out in the official comments accompanying the
blackletter text. On our account, courts committed to textualist orthodoxy must
not ignore the ULC’s discussion of why the blackletter text was adopted,
including how it was meant to operate and what problems it was designed to
solve. Sometimes, the details of particular legislative processes have surprising
consequences.

